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J [JRISDICTIONAL a i A i KMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Court, ol' Appeals' decision pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. J 8 2-2(3)(a).
ISSUE AND S' I ANDi iRI) OF REV IEYV
Issue: Whether the panel majority of the court of appeals erred in its construction
and application of the rules governing appellate consideration of challenges to denials of
miiiiti.it \ i i n l ^ m r n l mi uliin ( itppi «tl I illmviiij' < nti', mil lin.il |iiill | l i)tniL

Standai d of Re\ iew i "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same
„ 11111111 il l*n 1 '<) t i v \ 11" \ i i "I. (in 'i "i "I. li "i i

i. I i 111 " I 111)| n. * i i >n t11 n.,"»11111 ni ."'n "i 11 "i * i \ v inv." 11, \ i \ ' \ v n 1 f o r

correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous."
Bowling v. Bullen, 20041 IT 50, f7, 94 P.3d 915.
Issue: v v hethei tl le pai lei ;t najorifr of tl le coi n It of appeals en ed in its
assessment of the effect of Petitioner's failure to explicitly raise the issue of duty of care
at trial after denial of its motion for summary judgment on that issue.
Stand ard of Rev ie \ t : "' On certiorari, w J review iik decision of the court of
a pp e a j s ^ n o j

| j i e (jeQision of the trial coi in: t Ii i doing so this c :>i n: I: adopt 5 tl ie sai n 5

standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for
correctness, and tik i.n;i v otu;;, kiuauu inklings are reversed "i< - •; cl^ai iy erroneous."
Dc mlm g v. Bulk m. 20041 J 1 50. f 7,9 I F 3< 191:::

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
None are dispositive of the issues on appeal. A copy of a portion of the relevant
jury instructions given to the jury are attached in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case
This is a wrongful death action, which arose when a tow truck driver, Dennis
Normandeau, was killed while unbolting the driveline of a Ryder rental truck that he was
going to tow. Plaintiffs brought this action against numerous defendants, including
Hanson Equipment. Hanson repaired a hydraulic hose in the truck prior to the trip during
which the truck broke down. Plaintiffs alleged that Hanson negligently repaired the
hydraulic hose which caused the truck to become disabled. The issues in the case were as
follows: (1) did Hanson owe a duty of care to the tow truck driver; (2) was Hansonfs
repair the proximate cause of Normandeau's death; and (3) were Normandeau's own acts
in preparing to tow the Ryder truck an intervening negligent act that broke the chain of
causation? Hanson submitted a motion for summary judgment on these issues.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts
Notwithstanding whether its repair was negligent, Hanson brought a motion for
summary in which it argued that it owed no duty of care to a remote tow truck driver and
that its repair was not Ihe proximate cause of the Normandeau's death. The trial court
denied Hanson's motion. The trial court's order denying Hanson's motion for summary
2

judgment provided no basis for the denial, did not indicate that issues of fact precluded
entry of summary judgment, and simply stated: "Hanson Equipment Inc.'s Motion for
Summary Judgment is Denied." See Order, attached in Addendum.
Because the issue of whether a duty of care is owed is a legal issue for the trial
court to decide and the trial court denied Hanson's motion without finding that any issues
of fact precluded summary judgment, Hanson did not argue the legal issue of duty to the
jury. The jury found in favor of plaintiffs on their negligence claim. Hanson then timely
appealed the issues presented in its motion for summary judgment, and the appeal was
poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals.
The main issue on appeal was the trial court's denial of Hanson's motion for
summary judgment. In other words, Hansen asked the Court of Appeals to review
whether the trial court pre-trial rulings were correct. Rather than addressing the merits of
the issues, the Court of Appeals determined it had no jurisdiction to review the denial of a
summary judgement motion after a trial on the merits. Judge Orme dissented on this
issue. This Court granted Certiorari on the issues of whether appellate courts have
jurisdiction to review pre-trial rulings and whether a pre-trial issue must be re-raised at
trial in order to preserve it for appeal.
Statement of Facts
This matter arises after Hanson Equipment performed repairs on a hydraulic hose
in a Ryder rental truck. (R. at 181-94) The Ryder rental truck broke down shortly after
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the repairs, requiring a tow truck to come and tow the vehicle. (R. at 181-94) While
preparing to tow the Ryder truck, the tow truck driver was killed when he was undoing
the bolts that secured the truck's driveline. (R. at 181-94) Plaintiffs filed a complaint
against numerous defendants, including Hanson. (R. at 181-194) Against Hanson,
plaintiffs' sole cause of action was for negligence, stating that Hanson negligently
repaired the truck that caused it "to break down under circumstances that required it to be
towed." (R. at 181-194)
A central issue in the case was whether Hanson, who repaired the truck, owed a
duty of care to a remote tow truck driver who was killed while performing his job of
towing a disabled vehicle. (R. at 612-748) In other words, assuming Hanson negligently
repaired the truck, did creating the condition that necessitated a tow truck create a duty of
care running between Hanson and the tow truck driver? (R. at 612-748) Before the trial
court, Hanson presented a motion for summary judgment on this issue, arguing that it
owed no duty of care to a tow truck driver who was injured while preparing to tow the
disabled truck. (R. at 612-748)
With respect to Hanson's statement of material facts in support of its motion for
summary judgment, plaintiffs did not dispute paragraphs 1-4, 5.d., 8, 10-18, or 22-26. (R.
at 831.) These undisputed facts established the relationship of the parties, and how the
decedent was killed. (R. at 619-23) Specifically, the undisputed facts established that
Hanson repaired one of the truck's hydraulic lines; a hydraulic line failed, disabling the
truck; decedent was called to tow the disabled truck; and decedent was killed as he was
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preparing to tow the truck when the driveline hit him in the head. (R. at 619-23, 831,
attached in addendum). The facts setting forth the parties1 relationship are all of the facts
necessary to resolve the issue of whether Hanson owed the decedent a duty of care.1
A hearing was held on Hanson's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 2078: 2854). During this hearing, the trial court never expressed any concerns that disputed issues
of fact precluded summary judgment in the case. (R. at 2078: 28-54, attached in
addendum). The trial court looked at foreseeability and the nexus between Hanson's
repair and the injury. (R. at 2078: 35-36,43,45,47) During oral argument, however,
neither party suggested that the trial court should reserve its ruling on the issue of duty
until trial. (R. at 2078: 28-54) Even plaintiffs counsel discussed that the issue of duty was
a legal issue for the trial court to decide before trial. (R. at 2078: 48). Plaintiffs counsel
instructed the trial court that duty was a threshold legal issue for the court to decide as a
matter of law, and the issues of proximate cause and intervening cause were factual issues
to be resolved by the jury. (R. at 2078: 48) On this point, plaintiffs counsel stated: "Duty
is decided by the Court, as a matter of law. I don't think there's an issue here that the jury
needs to decide. This is - ought to be decided by the Judge, by the Court, whether or not

1

As to those facts that plaintiffs did dispute, the facts were not material to the issue
of whether a duty of care was owed. Specifically, plaintiffs' only dispute related what
Normandeau knew about towing procedures and what he may have done to cause the
accident. (R. at 831fl[5.a., b , & a ) , 833 fl[6-7), 834 fl[19), 835 fl[20), 837 fl[21), 838
(f28)). The remaining disputed paragraphs concern opinions as to who was liable for the
accident and are not material facts. (R. at 834 fl[9), 837 fl[27), 838 (Iff 28, 29), 839 (f 30),
840(H31)).
5

there's a duty." (R. at 2078: 48 (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the parties and the trial
court all contemplated that the issue of duty would be decided by the trial court as a pretrial ruling.
Ultimately, the trial court's ruling was based on its perception that the allegedly
negligent repair created a dangerous situation for the tow truck driver. (R. at 2078: 38,
53-54). In its ruling, the trial court summarized, stating: "based on my understanding of
mechanics, it just seems to me that the failure of the hose exposes the tow truck driver
who's got to disconnect, if he's going to tow, the drive shaft, to a hazardous situation."
(R. at 2078:54).
Following the hearing, the trial court's Order on Hanson's motion, stated: "Hanson
Equipment Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied." (R. at 1182-86, attached in
addendum) Hanson appealed the trial court's denial of its summary judgment motion on
the issue of whether it owed a duty of care. At trial, the jury was only instructed as to
general principals of negligence that did not relate to duty. Specifically, the jury was only
instructed as to the general law of negligence, MUJI 3.1, et seq., attached in the
addendum. (R. at 1514-68, 2077) The jury was not given any instruction that would
relate to the legal conclusion of duty.
Rather than addressing the merits of Hanson's argument on whether a duty of care
was owed, the Utah Court of Appeals, with Judge Orme dissenting on the issue, avoided
the merits of the argument and stated that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the issue

6

because the trial in the cas^ ' rrrloso(i :jnnolKr n-*
motion. See Normandcau v. Hans*

/

t * ">.

Inc., 2007 LH >\pp 38.* at *

SU M M A R i ufr A K ^ l VihlM '

- '-• i LI) KhLlhfr

Before the Utah Coi u t of Appeals I lanson challenged se veral of the ti ial c -oi it t s
pre-trial rulings. ' Fhe basic theme of Hanson's appeal was that this case should not have
been allowed to go to trial. Central among the issues on appeal was the trial court's denia'l

purely legal issue of whether Hanson owed the decedent a duty of care.
Rather than addressing the merits oi I lansou .> m^uon ior summary judgment, the
I ' .ml ni Appr/1,!", ,'i.it, liiilnl i!! ImU'kn) |urr>du linn I,, i n in,v Ihr ilnnul \\\ a motion l.ir
summary judgment after a trial on the merits. In this case, however, the issue of whether
Hanson owed a aui> ^i care was a threshold k:;al issue that the trial court alone was
as

x

i

was not presented to the jury, furthermore, the facts relevant to whether a duty of care
was owed were not in dispute, nor did the trial court make any findings that disputed facts

and no facts were in dispute, the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that it lacked
jurisdiction to review the issue and erred when it concluded that the issue was presented
In tin" (in ' and runlet! In lie rrnrurd al liial in nrdn In prcst'i'vc .ippellak1 |unsdii'lhni.
Hanson is requesting this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals and require
appellate review of threshold pre-trial rulings on a legal issue where no issues of fact are
7

in dispute and where the trial court does not reserve its ruling on the issue. Also, Hanson
is requesting that this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Hanson was
required to re-raise issues in its summary judgment motion at trial in order to preserve the
pre-trial legal issue for appeal. In summary, Hanson is requesting this Court to reinforce
its prior rulings that Utah's appellate courts have jurisdiction to make sure the trial court
got the law right.
ARGUMENT
I.

The court of appeals erred in concluding that it lacked appellate
jurisdiction over a pre-trial denial of Hanson's motion for summary
judgment where the question presented in the pre-trial motion could
not be raised at trial.
A.

The issue of duty is a threshold question of law for the trial court alone
to decide.

In discussing the "knotty and confusing" problems presented by traditional
negligence terms, Professor Thode noted at the outset: "the allocation of functions
between judge and jury plays an important part." E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: DutyRisk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and
Jury, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1,1. Later Professor Thode stated: "In the division of functions
between judge and jury, the duty issue is an issue of law for the court." Id, at 13.
Since Professor Thode's article in 1977, Utah's appellate courts have consistently
held that the issue of duty is a legal conclusion for the court, not the jury, to decide. See
Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80,1J9, 125 P.3d 906; Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT

8

' \ P r ' " «x r> 7 |\3d l()l V ^"whether a duty of care is owed is'entirely j) ;nestionof law to
he determined h\ the coin

Moreover, this Court recently discussed Put because "one

may not be liable to another in tort absc... .. *u;.. u....
begins with an nu.

* jrv ai.^i}.^

..:•...

iim

uto the existence and scope of the duty owed the plaintiff by the

defendai it." "• < •. ttoodsideHomes Corp., 2006 I T -i"\ «*• i "4/ P \\ 283.
Accordingly under mi:, v otii tJ"s analysis "[the question • •-. .idi.u a legal duty exists] is
the first question to be answered " Id at f 14
Based on this well established body of law, Hanson filed a pre-trial moiU MI for
summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty of care to the decedent as a mat.*.. < .. ' In

would not be presented to the uirv: ,s[ don't think there's an issue here that the jury needs
tockudo. \h

.

t

v I* it.i court denied ii .L u 4ion and did not tmd any

otherwise indicate that it wanted inrther briefing or evidence in order to make its
decision. Consistent with the governing Utah law, the parties and the trial court
i ecognized the issi le of di it) vv as a thr eshold legal issi le tl ial: w as presented, argued, ai id
ruled upon.
According! \, the parties and the trial .-^u-t recognized that the issue of duty was a
pr :: ti ial legal issi le foi the coi n It t : • decide

\ bsent a di it;; of cai • s. tl le case coi ild it lot gc • to

the jury. Thus, the trial court ruled on this issue before trial. At trial, the issue of duty
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was not presented, and the jury was not instructed on the issue. As Professor Thode
noted: ""keep in mind that the instruction to the jury did not inform it in any
understandable way that it was making a decision about the scope of the law's protection
in the case at issue, nor did the court inform the jury about the policies by which its
decision would be tested." Thode, 1977 Utah Law Rev. 1 at p. 18.
The reason the question of duty is a legal question that must be decided by the
court as a threshold matter is that it is based primarily on policy judgments applied to the
parties' relationship. See Yazd, 2006 UT 47 at f 17. Thus, in order for the court to render
a decision as to whether the law permits a duty to arise, "a court must understand that the
structure and dynamics of the relationship between the parties gives rise to the duty." Id.
at f 14. As a general principal, "[a] relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely to
be accompanied by a duty than one, for example, in which the parties are in privity of
contract." Id. Depending upon how attenuated the parties' relationship is, the court may
be "called upon to make policy choices based on assessment of social, economic, and
technological conditions." Id. at ^[19. Thus, this Court summarized a court's obligation
with respect to this threshold legal question: "When policy considerations bear on a
subject lodged firmly within the court's sphere, like the common law, it is entirely
appropriate for the court to make the policy judgments necessary to get the law right." Id.
at 1f20.

10

Notwithstanding tl lese consideratioi is the Cc 1 n I: of A ppeals conch ided the
following: (1) the issue of duty was presented at trial, (2) Hanson should have renewed its
mouon a! u u; . ;. tnc i.ssuv. w.; xuu*. jik.. • * i lie court kuKcd juijoviiciiwj. .* icview a pre-

that effectively prevents appellate review of pre-trial rulings, 'I lie Court of Appeals'
conclusion essentially abdicates its role as an appellate court and prevents any sort of

review the trial court's pre-trial ruling as to whether the law recognized a duty in this case.
.-*er won\«
1

'

idii^wu a^kcd UK. \ ouii o\ Appeals to Un>k at whether the trial court got
•

it I Jtah*

Hate c • :>iii ts

lack jurisdiction to review a trial court's pre-trial legal rulings.
A* to tlh. i vsuc oi uiu\ in mis case, the parties presented undisputed facts about the

JunciioL, Colorado. Among other things, Hanson repairs large trucks. The decedent was
a tow truck driver., based out of Price, Utah. The parties' paths crossed when a h »ek that

parties' relationship was "highly attenuated" and "less likely to be accompanied by a legal
di ity M Yazd, 2006 LIT 47 at 116.
Because tl le nati it : of tl ic pai ties' i elatioi isl lij: did i lot si if: poi I: ai i ofr rioi is ii it) of
care, the trial court was then required to look at policy considerations in order to
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determine whether a duty at law existed, and if it did exist, the scope and nature of the
duty owed. In summary, the question facing the trial court was: Given the attenuated
relationship between a repair shop in Colorado and a tow truck driver in Utah, did the
surrounding policy considerations warrant finding the existence of a legal duty of care?
In addition to the policy considerations, this Court has also looked at the positions
of the parties as it related to parity of knowledge. See Yazd, 2006 UT 47 at fl22-26.
Often, parity of knowledge relates to the duty to disclose knowledge from one party to
another because of one party's superior position to know facts that would be material to
the actions of the other. See id. at f23. In that circumstance, a duty may exist and then
end when a party acquires that knowledge from another source. See id.
Applying these considerations to the undisputed facts of this case required the trial
court to make the following considerations in ruling on Hanson's motion for summary
judgment: (1) did Hanson owe the decedent a legal duty to properly repair the truck?; (2)
did Hanson possess superior knowledge that it had a duty to disclose to the decedent?; (3)
did any policy considerations, either social, economic, or technological, support the
existence of a duty of care? Hanson argued that it owed the decedent no duty to properly
repair the truck,2 that it did not possess any superior knowledge as to how to tow the
truck, and that no policy considerations supported a duty running from a repair shop to a

2

Indeed, the decedent's business relies on trucks breaking down and needing to be

towed.
12

remote and unknown tow truck di iver 1 1 le ti ial coi n t disagreed

A ftei a ti ial ii i \ < I iicl 1

none of these issues were presented to a jury, Hanson requested appellate review of
whethe. inc trial court's legal conclusion that a duty existed was correct,

in * om i -i

Appeals, however, determined it coi iid not i evie\* the issi le.
T h e Court of Appeals 1 opinion conflicts with established U t a h law.

B.

In contrast to the Coui t of Appeals' decision in this case, this Coui t has recently
reviewed a trial conit'i pic tn.il iiiniliii!" and \ a e a l r d ,i |iiii , AW ml b e m u s e the In il i nun 1
erroneous ruling allow cci • . a m to g o to the jury. In Prince. Yeates & Geldzahler
Young. .

=

Like this casr

»:

)\

..».<» , iirm asserted chums against one of its associates.
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'

^

•* • --: :*-- l':

^socialr o w n ! Ih. Iinti

a legal duty. Before trial, the law h i m moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that
its associate owed i!i<. un\ iirm a duty ol u n e , and the associate also moved for partial
SMI

"

I'lt'i".

firm's motion, finding no duty was owed, and the case proceeded to trial. At a ial, a - •'•*
awarded the associak >2NO.000.
O n appeal
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The relief granted by this Court in the Prince, Yeates opinion is the precise relief
sought by Hanson in this case. Hanson argued the trial court erred in its legal conclusion
with respect to whether it owed a duty of care. Absent a duty of care, plaintiffs' case
should not have gone to trial, and the jury?s verdict could not stand. In short, Hanson
argued the case should have never made it to the jury. Hanson requested the Court of
Appeals review the trial court's pre-trial decision to allow the case to go to the jury as a
matter of law.
The Court of Appeals' decision to conclude that it did not have jurisdiction to
review a pre-trial ruling on a motion for summary judgment conflicts with the Prince,
Yeates decision. In addition to be contrary to Prince, Yeates, the Court of Appeals'
opinion in this case conflicts with other opinions from this Court. Specifically, in
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, f 20, 144 P.3d 1147, this Court held that issues raised
in motion for partial summary judgment and that could not be addressed at trial may be
appealed and reviewed by an appellate court. As set forth above, the legal and policy
considerations that surround the question of whether the law recognizes a duty are not
trial issues. The jury makes no findings relative to the issue, and the jury is not instructed
as to the law of duty. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case conflicts
with this Court's precedent in Wayment.
In addition to being contrary to these opinions, the Court of Appeals' opinion
creates a difficult situation in which a party will be forced to either guess as to what may
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be sufficient to preserve an issue and/or be forced to raise and re-raise the issue at
multiple stages of the case in order to preserve appellate jurisdiction to review the issue.

court's resources, as indies will be forced to revisit prior rulings. This Court has
previously articulated a simplei. more workable standard. In Brookside Mobile Home
i

counsel has raised an issue before the trial com t, and the trial court has considered the
issue, the issue is preserved for appeal
:.. .: .

,#

The Brookside

standaid is a better standard than

\> case nn< ;-: ........

.* .. > \.ic siana.;u! mai r ,o\c;'ned

this ease. Hanson was entitled to rely on Prince, Yeates, Wayment, and Brookside in
order to determine if it had properly preserved its arguments for appeal.
...I.'....,
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Brown v. j

?-,•• ing expert in opposition to Harmon's m o * n ^ :.>r nummaryjudgmen
j
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Appeals reviewed the denial of partial summary judgment motion after trial on merits
where one of tl: ic issues on appeal was review of a motion to slr.KC an improper ailhiavit
i ised to oppose a pre ti ial i i lotioi i If ai i.. appellate coi 1.1 1: cai 11 e> ie \ v x\ lietl lei 01 nc t a
motion to strike was properly or improperly granted, it must also retain jurisdiction to
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apply its ruling on the motion to strike to the motion for summary judgment where the
affidavit was used in support or in opposition. Otherwise, an appellate court could find
an affidavit was improperly used to oppose a motion for summary judgment, but then it
could not review the effects of the affidavit because it lacked jurisdiction to review the
motion for summary judgment.
In summary, a bright line rule that prohibits appellate review of a pre-trial motion
for summary judgment is unworkable. Utah's appellate courts need jurisdiction to review
pre-trial rulings in order to ensure that the trial court got "the law right." Hanson is
requesting this Court to correct the Court of Appeals' erroneous conclusion that it lacked
jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Hanson
only petitioned for Certiorari on the issue of whether the Court of Appeals could review
the trial court's ruling on the legal issue of duty. In articulating a standard, however,
Hanson would argue that in certain instances other threshold legal issues could be
reviewed after a trial on the merits. This Court has issued many opinions that allow for
grants of summary judgment on questions that are usually fact sensitive, but based on the
facts of the case, may be disposed of as a matter of law.
II.

Hanson was not required to re-raise the issue of duty of care in order to
preserve appellate review.
A.

Factors relating to Duty are not evidentiary or trial issues.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals' opinion, the factors relating to whether a duty of
care was owed were not trial issues and were not presented to the jury. The trial court
16

rather than IIK- T»-V must decide questions of law as distinguished !•••:•
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increases the risk of harm, and general policy considerations." AMS Salt Industries, 942
P.2dat321.
Despite prior Utah law holding that the issue of duty of care must be determined
by the trial court and, that foreseeability is not the only factor relevant to ascertaining
duty, two judges of the Court of Appeals determined that the issue of duty is "heavily
fact-sensitive" and should have been presented to the jury because it is "intertwined with
the issue of foreseeability." See Normandeau, 2007 UT App 382 at ^[14. This
determination came after the Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged that the issue of
duty is "technically an issue of law." Id. Nevertheless, two judges determined that the
issue of foreseeability was presented to the jury and was decided against Hanson and thus
Hanson "was accorded the opportunity to fully litigate [its] case." See id.
At the summary judgment stage in this case, the trial court did not find any issues
of fact which precluded a ruling on whether a duty of care was owed, thus the issue was
not reserved for judgment at trial. Moreover, the trial court's ruling was not based on
foreseeability. Even if foreseeability was the determinative issue, courts have also
recognized that the underlying question of foreseeability, as it relates to a duty of care, is
a question of law for the courts. See Lee v. Farmer's Rural Electric Cooperative Corp.,
245 S.W.3d 209, 218 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); Herrera . Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 186
(N.M. 2003); Rinehart ex. rel Combs v. Boys and Girls Club ofChula Vista, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 677, 684 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that foreseeability when analyzed to
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determine the scope of duty is a question of law). Since factors relating to whether a duty
of care is owed are not presented to a jury, Hanson could not have explicitly raised the
issue of duty of care at trial.
B,

Jury instructions do not address factors relating to duty.

Assuming that evidence was presented at trial that related to whether a duty of care
was owed, the jury instructions on negligence do not address any of the factors that a trial
court must consider in determining whether the law imposes a duty of care, and the jury
made no findings to assist the trial court in its decision. Compare MUJI 3.1, et seq.
(setting forth juryfs consideration of issue of negligence), with Little, 667 P.3d at 54-55
(discussing factors for determining duty) and Thode, 1977 Utah Law Rev. 1 at 28 ('The
determination of the issue of duty and whether it includes the particular risk imposed on
the victim ultimately rests upon the broad policies which underlie the law. These policies
may be characterized generally as morality, the economic good of the group, practical
administration of the law, justice as between the parties and other considerations relative
to the environment out of which the case arose."). The multitude of factors which
contribute toward the finding of duty are complex and overlapping are not conducive to
being reduced to jury instructions. It is not the jury's role to determine the scope of the
law's protection; the jury's role is to determine issues of fact. It is up to the Court alone
to say whether or not the law provides a duty of care.
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In summary, "[a] court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is 'an
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say
that the plaintiff is [or is not] entitled to protection.'" Id; (citing Webb v. Univ. of Utah,
2005 UT 80,1f9, 15 P.3d 906 (quoting Univ. Of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57
(Colo. 1987)). Juries are not in the same position to make these social and moral policy
based decisions as are judges. Thus, the Court of Appeals1 conclusion that the issue of
duty was raised at trial was erroneous.
C.

Rule 50 requires a motion be made at trial on issues presented at trial,
no reason exists to extend that reasoning to issues not presented at trial.

The Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that by failing to move for
"dismissal" at trial, Hanson failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Apparently, a motion
for "dismissal" should have taken the form of a Rule 50 motion. A motion for directed
verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made pursuant to Rule 50 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are made based on the evidence presented at trial.
Utah Rule Civ. P. 50. According to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, "[n]ot every
denial of a motion for summary judgment requires a subsequent Rule 50 motion in order
to be appealable." Wilson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 56 F.3d 1226, 1239 (10th Cir.
1995) (reviewing pre-trial negligence ruling after trial). A critical distinction exists
between summary judgment motions which raise the sufficiency of the evidence to create
a fact question for the jury and those raising a question of law that the court must decide.
See id. Appellate review of a motion for summary judgment based on an issue of law is
20

proper even if the case proceeds to trial and the moving party does not make a subsequent
Rule 50 motion. See id. No Rule 50 motion is required to preserve the issue when the
issue was a question of law for the court to decide. See id.
The trial court properly treated the issue of duty as a threshold legal issue. Utah
law foreclosed the issue of duty from being reargued at trial since the trial court had
already ruled on that issue as a matter of law. Hanson could not have moved for a
directed verdict or for "dismissal/1 as reasoned by Court of Appeals, on the issue of
whether a duty of care was owed since evidence was not and could not have been
presented on the issue of duty at the trial. A Rule 50 motion for directed verdict and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict was not required to preserve the question of law
previously determined by the trial court. Thus, the Court of Appeals* ruling that Hanson
failed to preserve the issues for appeal was is erroneous.

21

CONCLUSION
Hanson requests this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals' determination that it
lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of Hanson's motion for summary
judgment. Additionally, because the issue of duty was not a trial issue and was not
presented at trial, Hanson requests this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals' conclusion
that Hanson failed to preserve the issues in its summary judgment motion for appeal by
not re-raising the issues at trial.
DATED this ^ % day of April, 2008.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

ZACHARY E. PETERSON
)rneys for Defendant Hanson Equipment,
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INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of the wrongful death of tow truck driver Dennis
Normandeau, who died while preparing to tow a Ryder truck that had broken down to the side of
the road. Among the eight defendants sued in this action is Hanson Equipment, a repair shop
that had previously serviced the truck. Plaintiffs allege a theory of negligence against Hanson
Equipment; however, summary judgment is proper because plaintiffs cannot establish two of the
four elements of a negligence claim: duty and causation. Hanson Equipment owed no duty of
care to the unforseeable decedent Normandeau, who was an independent, subsequent tow truck
driver. And, the plaintiffs' "but for" causation theory is too tenuous to assign fault to Hanson
Equipment as a proximate cause of Normandeau's injury. Normandeau himself was the
intervening, superceding cause of his own death that broke any chain of "but for" causation to
Hanson Equipment.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
AS TO WHICH NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS
1.

This lawsuit arises from the death of tow-truck driver Dennis Normandeau.3

2.

Normandeau died on November 10, 2001, during the process of preparing to tow a

Ryder moving truck that had broken down at the side of the road while atop Soldier Summit in
Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah.4

Attached to this Memorandum and marked as Exhibit A is the Amended Complaint and Jury Demand,
filed September 22, 2003
4

See Ex A, Am Compl atffi[32 and 40-43.
V

\J

Pi

Normandeau's Training & Experience
3.

Earlier that year, Normandeau had started working for Kenworth Sales Company

("Kenworth"), a diesel maintenance and repair shop and towing service.5
4.

In May or June 2001, he was transferred into the shop to be the primary wrecker

driver; when Normandeau wasn't towing trucks, he worked as a mechanic.6
5.

Normandeau's supervisor at Kenworth, Kyle Bundy, who has twenty years'

wrecking experience, taught Normandeau how to use a large diesel wrecker.7
a.

Mr. Bundy took Normandeau on four practice towing trips.8

b.

Mr. Bundy taught Normandeau how to test whether or not a vehicle has

any built-up tension in its drive line by first wiggling it to determine whether or not it will
rotate, or whether it's too tight.9
c.

Mr. Bundy taught Normandeau that if he detected that the driveline was

not loose, then he needed to relieve the pressure by jacking up the back tire or putting the
transmission in neutral.10

5

Attached to this Memorandum and marked as Exhibit B are pertinent portions of the deposition of Kyle
Bundy, conducted March 12, 2004, at pages 11 25-13 21
6

See Ex B, Bundy Depo at 49 5-19 and 51 19-23

7

See Ex B , Bundy Depo at 29 13-16

8

Id. at 13 17-14 6, 24 21-25 11, and 47 5-24

9

Id. at 25 24-26 7 and 40 11-41 7

10

Id_at20 11-22 24 and 25 6-23

vi

d.

Mr. Bundy watched Normandeau disassemble a driveline following this

procedure on three or four occasions.11
6.

On average, Noramandeau towed vehicles similar to the Ryder truck three to five

times a month.12
7.

Mr. Bundy testified it's "Basic Mechanics 101" for wrecker drivers to try to

wiggle the driveline and if it has tension, to put the truck in neutral and raise the rear tires before
disassembling it.13
8.

Mr. Bundy testified that if a drive line doesn't wiggle, there is no way to quantify

how much tension is built up in it, whether it be 100 pounds or 10,000 pounds of pressure.14
Events Leading up to the Accident
9.

Defendant Hanson Equipment, in Grand Junction, Colorado, is in the business of

servicing and repairing trucks, including the model involved in this case.15
10.

On November 8, 2001, Hanson Equipment serviced this Ryder truck's hydraulic

line for the brakes and power steering.16

11

Id. at 24 24-26 21

12

Id. at 50 21-51 18

13

Id. at 26 22-27 13

14

See Ex B , Bundy Depo at 59 25-60 18

See Ex A, Am Compl at ^ 21, see also, Exhibit C, the deposition of Clyde Alberts, conducted May 4,
2004, at 9 17-21 and 16 6-25
See Ex A, Am Compl at ^ 30, see also Exhibit D, the deposition of Jeiome Williams, conducted May
4, 2004, at 21 2-9

vii

11.

The next day, Kristen Marion rented the truck and planned to drive it to

Silverdale, Washington, where she was moving her family.17
12.

On November 10, 2001, en route to Washington, and while atop Soldier Summit

in Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah, the truck's hydraulic line for the brakes and power steering failed,
and Ms. Marion slowly pulled the truck off to the side of the road.18
13.

Ms. Marion then contacted Ryder Roadside Assistance, who initially dispatched

tow truck driver Larry Freeman to the scene.19
14.

When Mr. Freeman arrived, he realized that his tow truck was too small to pull

the Ryder truck.20
15.

Nonetheless, Mr. Freeman thought he might be able to fix the truck, so he

removed a hose that appeared to be dripping power steering fluid; he called various repair shops
to find a replacement, but was unable to find one.21

See Ex. A, Am. Compl at ^] 24-31; see also Exhibit E, the deposition of Kristen Marion, conducted
March 24, 2005, at 8:24-10:9 and 125.9-21.
1 O

See Ex. A, Am. Compl at ^ 32; see also, Ex. E, the Marion Depo, at 84:1-5.
See Ex. A, Am Compl at ^ 33; see also, Exhibit F, the deposition of Larry Freeman, conducted
November 18, 2003, at 14:1-17.
See Ex. A, Am. Compl. atU 34, see also Ex. F, Freeman Depo., at 14.19-15:10.
21

See Ex. F, Freeman Depo. at 32:15-33:7 and 39:16-40:13.
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16.

Since he was unable to replace the hose, Kenworth was dispatched to bring a large

diesel wrecker to tow the truck.22
17.

Kenworth sent wrecker driver Normandeau.23

18.

In order to tow the truck, Normandeau had to disconnect the driveline.24

19.

To disconnect the driveline, Normandeau needed to first relieve any built-up

torque.25
20.

Unfortunately, Normandeau did not attempt to wiggle the driveline to check for

any built up tension.26
21.

Instead of checking for any torque build up, Normandeau started to remove the

four bolts from the yoke that connects the driveline to the rear differential.27
22.

Unfortunately, significant torque had built up m the driveline, and when

Normandeau had removed the third bolt only about an eighth of an inch, the driveline broke free,
suddenly striking Normandeau in the head, killing him.28

See Ex F, Freeman Depo at 41 3-42 1, see also, photograph of the Ryder truck and diesel wrecker,
attached as an exhibit to the Freeman Depo , and included in Ex F
See Ex A, Am Compl at 1| 33, see also Ex F, Fieeman Depo at 42 2-9
See Ex A, Am Compl at ^ 37
See Ex A, Am Compl at ^ 40, see also, Ex F, Freeman Depo at 96 11-25
See Ex F, Freeman Depo at 97 1-3, see also, Ex E, Mai ion Depo at 101 13-1026
See Ex F photographs from Freemen Depo That show the driveline and the Ryder truck and
Ken worth's wreckei
28

See Ex F, Freeman Depo at 103 21-104 4 and 105 5-25
IX

23.

Mr. Freeman reached over and grabbed Normandeau's head before it hit the

ground, and realized Normandeau was dead.29
After the Accident
24.

After the police arrived, another tow truck driver, Landon Jacobson, was called to

the scene to finish towing the truck.30
25.

Mr. Jacobson never learned why the truck was being towed; nonetheless, he

towed the truck, using Normandeau's wrecker, without incident.31
26.

Mr. Jacobson, who had five years' towing experience, testified that before a tow

he always checks the driveline to see if there is any built-up tension in it before he disassembles
it. 32

27.

When Mr. Jacobson was asked his opinion regarding why this accident happened,

he testified "obviously there was pressure on the driveline, so I guess that wasn't checked.,.."33
28.

When asked if he had ever read that built-up tension in a driveline can kill you,

Mr. Jacobson replied, "It is just kind of-for mechanics, mechanic eveiyday kind of knowledge, I
"34

guess.
29

See Ex. F, Freeman Depo. at 48:5-15.
30

See Ex. B, Bundy Depo. at 41:17-42:1.
See Ex. G, Jacobson Depo. at 16:10-17:6.

32

See Ex. G, Jacobson Depo. at 30:1-13, 32:2-6, and 38:15-39:2.
See Ex. G, Jacobson Depo. at 48:6-22.
See Ex. G, Jacobson Depo. at 51:1 -9.
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29.

Normandeau's supervisor Mr. Bundy believes Normandeau made a mistake by

not first trying to release and unload the pressure that was built-up in the driveline before he
attempted to disassemble it.35
30.

When Mr. Bundy was asked, "[W]ho, other than Mr. Normandeau would be

responsible for his accident?" He answered, "Nobody I know."36
31.

In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege only one theory of liability against

defendant Hanson Equipment for the negligent repair of the truck, which caused it "to break
down under circumstances that required it to be towed."37

35

See Ex B, Bundy Depo at 27 17-28 2

36

See Ex B, Bundy Depo at 56 3-10

37

See Ex A, Am Compl at1J59 c
XI

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this motion, the plaintiffs do not dispute paragraphs 1-4, 5.d, 8, 10-18
and 22-26 of Hanson's statement of facts. They respond to the other numbered paragraphs as
follows:
"5.a.

Mr. Bundy took Normandeau on four practice towing trips."

Response:

Although Mr. Bundy and Mr. Normandeau went on four trips together—

twice where Mr. Bundy was the primary driver and Mr. Normandeau observed, and twice where
Mr. Normandeau was the primary driver and Mr. Bundy observed, none of those trips involved
the particular type of truck or braking system involved in this case.1
"5.b.

Mr. Bundy taught Normandeau how to test whether or not a vehicle has any built-

up tension in its drive line by first wiggling it to determine whether or not it will rotate, or
whether it's too tight."
Response:

The plaintiffs dispute any implication in paragraph 5.b that Mr.

Normandeau did not test the driveline for built-up tension. Mr. Bundy testified that, by
"wiggling" the driveline, he meant seeing if it would rotate.2 There are several ways to "wiggle"
the driveline.3 Mr. Bundy testified that his "preference" for determining whether the driveline
1

Dep. of Kyle Bundy, the cited portions of which are attached as exhibit 1, at
29:22-30:6,47:21-48:1.
2

See id at 40:11-14.

3

See id at 40:15-22.
3

^^Lr—^ I

was loose or not was "putting a wrench on it and--like you are going to take the bolts out."4 He
said, "I put my wrench on the bolt and just rock it back and forth.... If it doesn't rock, then I do
whatever it takes to free it up."5 Mr. Normandeau put his wrench on the bolts, as evidenced by
the fact that he had removed two of the bolts when the accident happened.6
"5.c.

Mr. Bundy taught Normandeau that if he detected that the driveline was not loose,

then he needed to relieve the pressure by jacking up the back tire or putting the transmission in
neutral."
Response:

Mr. Bundy testified that he trained Mr. Normandeau that, if the driveline

was not loose, he had to "move the truck back or forward"7 or "jack a tire up, or start the engine
and relieve the brake pressure."8 However, Mr. Bundy further testified that in this case "starting
the engine would not have done it, because the line had a hole in it, you know, to create the

4

Id. at 25:24-26:4.

5

Id. at 33:11-18. See also id. at 21:19-22 ("when I put my wrench on the bolt to
loosen the bolt, if I couldn't move the driveline, I done whatever it took to relieve the tension").
6

E.g., Dep. of Larry Freeman, the cited portions of which are attached as exhibit 2,

at 46:13-47:4.
7

Bundy dep., ex. 1, at 20:20-22. See also id. at 54:15-19.

8

M a t 25:12-23.
4

problem to begin with.'"9 Moreover, according to International's safety engineer, moving the
truck back can actually cause torque in the driveline.10
"6.

On average, Noramandeau [sic] towed vehicles similar to the Ryder truck three to

five times a month."
Response:

Although Mr. Normandeau had towed similar vehicles before, Mr. Bundy

did not know whether any of them involved a hydraulic hose that had failed.11
"7.

Mr. Bundy testified it's 'Basic Mechanics 101' for wrecker drivers to try to

wiggle the driveline and if it has tension, to put the truck in neutral and raise the rear tires before
disassembling it."
Response:

The quoted phrase is from counsel's question, which was paraphrasing an

earlier conversation Mr. Bundy had had with counsel for defendant Bendix Commercial Vehicle
Systems, LLC.12 Although Mr. Bundy and Landon Jacobson, another tow-truck driver, thought it
was common knowledge how to release pressure on the driveline,13 Larry Freeman, the tow-truck
driver with the most experience of any of them, testified:

9

M a t 28:9-13.

10

See Dep. of Richard A. Mink, P.E., the cited portions of which are attached as
exhibit 3, at 102:14-103:1.
11

See Bundy dep., ex. 1, at 64:12-15.

12

See id at 27:9-13.

13

See Tf 28 & response, infra.
5

^ 4

There is something I didn't know, and I don't know that if anybody knew
it. Nobody in that area knew how to release the pressure off of that driveline.
Nobody had ever been taught. Nobody had ever been-on the truck there is no
warning around it. In the manual, there is no nothing of it.
As far as I know, there is no way of releasing that brake, you know, to get
the tension off. That is a bad situation... ,14
He later found out that you could release the tension by jacking up the rear wheel, but, he
said, "[W]e didn't know that. I have been in this business for 32 years. I bet I have dropped, I
must have dropped 30 of them or better, and I never even thought anything of it."15
"9.

Defendant Hanson Equipment, in Grand Junction, Colorado, is in the business of

servicing and repairing trucks, including the model involved in this case."
Response:

The repairs involved in this case were made out of Hanson's Glenwood

Springs, Colorado, location, not its Grand Junction location.16
"19.

To disconnect the driveline, Normandeau needed to first relieve any built-up

torque" (citing paragraph 40 of the amended complaint and page 96, lines 11-25, of Mr.
Freeman's deposition).
Response:

This paragraph is not supported by the portions of the record cited.

Paragraph 40 of the amended complaint alleges that Mr. Normandeau followed normal procedure
14

Freeman dep., ex, 2, at 50:19-51:17.

15

Id at 52:1-5.

16

See, e.g., Dep. of Jerome Williams, the cited portions of which are attached as
exhibit 4, at 22:20-23:12; 124:12-20.
6

in unhooking the driveshaft. The cited portion of Mr. Freeman's deposition says that Mr.
Normandeau got his wrench and started to drop the driveline by unbolting it. Whether it was
common knowledge among tow truck drivers like Mr. Normandeau that one has to relieve any
built-up torque before disconnecting a driveline is a disputed issue of fact.17 Mr. Freeman, who
has some thirty years' experience towing, testified that he would not have tried to wiggle the
driveshaft but would have just dropped it.18
"20.

Unfortunately, Normandeau did not attempt to wiggle the driveline to check for

any built up tension" (citing page 97, lines 1-3, of Mr. Freeman's deposition and page 101, line
13, to page 102, line 6, of Kristen Marion's deposition).
Response:

Although neither Mr. Freeman nor Ms. Marion remembered seeing Mr.

Normandeau checking for built-up tension in the driveline, their testimony is not conclusive on
that matter because neither of them was watching Mr. Normandeau the whole time. Mr.
Freeman testified as follows:
Q.
driveline?
A.
A.
Q.

Did you ever see him reach over and attempt to wiggle the
No, / don't think he did.
. . . [U]sually on a big outfit, there is no torque on them.
But you didn't see him do that?

See response to ^f 7, supra.
Freeman dep., ex. 2, at 176:5-15.
7

A.

I don't think he did, but I am not sure. He could have.l9

Ms. Marion testified that she does not know anything about towing.20 She was standing
at the back wheels while Mr. Normandeau was under the truck.21 Ms. Marion then turned
around. She "remember[ed] them doing some stuff," but she was trying to get things ready to
leave and went back to the car and got in it.22 When asked if she saw Mr. Normandeau try to
move or wiggle the drive shaft or try to reposition the vehicle, Ms. Marion said, "No," but then
added, "I didn't pay attention to any of that, no."23 She further testified, "I don't remember the
actual procedure happening, no."24
Mr. Normandeau could have checked the driveline for built-up tension.25 The only
person who knows whether Mr. Normandeau checked for built-up tension is Mr. Normandeau,
and he is dead.

19

Id at 97:1-3, 9-13 (emphasis added). See also id at 42:24-43:1 ("I am not sure
what [Mr. Normandeau did] exactly, because I was out talking to the lady [Ms. Marion] at this
time").
20

Dep. of Kristen Marion, the cited portions of which are attached as exhibit 5, at

47:12-13.
21

Mat99:16-101:l.

22

Id at 42:24-43:6; 101:5-8.

23

See id at 101:13-102:16.

24

M a t 103:1-2.

25

See response to ^f 5.c, supra.
8

"21.

Instead of checking for any torque build up, Normandeau started to remove the

four bolts from the yoke that connects the driveline to the rear differential."
Response:

The plaintiffs do not dispute that Mr. Normandeau started to remove the

bolts from the yoke that connected the driveline to the rear differential. It is unknown whether
Mr. Normandeau checked for any torque build up first.26
"27.

When Mr. Jacobson was asked his opinion regarding why this accident happened,

he testified 'obviously there was pressure on the driveline, so I guess that wasn't checked....'"
Response:

Mr. Jacobson's testimony was inadmissible. It was speculative and lacked

foundation. Mr. Jacobson did not see the accident happen and did not talk with anyone involved
in the accident, other thain a brief conversation with the investigator, who "didn't really say a lot"
but "just said that it was okay to take the truck to the shop and that."27 Counsel for the plaintiffs
and for International objected to the testimony on the grounds of speculation and lack of
foundation.28 Mr. Jacobson's complete answer was: "I think~I mean, obviously there was
pressure on the driveline, so I guess that wasn't checked. It is hard to say. I mean, you would

26

See response to ^f 5.c & 20, supra.

27

See Dep. of Landon Jacobson, the cited portions of which are attached as exhibit
6, at 12:20-13:19.
28

See id at 48:6-11.
9
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think that it was the pressure of the driveline that had killed him, butfirst--1don't know, the
driveline."29
"28.

When asked if he had ever read that built-up tension in a driveline can kill you,

Mr. Jacobson replied, 'It is just kind of-for mechanics, mechanic everyday kind of knowledge, I
guess.'"
Response: Mr. Jacobson so testified. However, he also testified that he had never read
that built-up tension in a driveline can be fatal and that the reason he was told to check for
driveline tension is because it is hard to undo the driveline if it is under pressure.30 He had never
heard of anyone being seriously hurt or killed from failure to check driveline tension.31 In fact,
he had never seen anything like this accident before.32
"29.

Normandeau's supervisor Mr. Bundy believes Normandeau made a mistake by

not first trying to release and unload the pressure that was built-up in the driveline before he
attempted to disassemble it."

29

Id at 48:13-18 (emphasis added).

30

See id at 51:1-5 & 51:15-52:5.

31

Id at 24:11-14; 52:6-9.

32

Id at 23:25-24:2.
10

Response:

Mr. Bundy's testimony was inadmissible. Plaintiffs' counsel objected to

the question to which Mr. Bundy was responding as calling for speculation and a conclusion.33
Mr. Bundy also lacked foundation for his opinion. Mr. Bundy was not present at the time of the
accident and did not know what attempts, if any, Mr. Normandeau had made to try to release
pressure in the driveline.34 When asked if Mr. Normandeau did anything wrong, Larry Freeman,
the most experienced tow-truck driver deposed, testified: "He done nothing that I wouldn't have
done or probably any other wrecker operator would have done. As far as I am concerned, he
done everything right. . . . fl[] I mean, that is my opinion, he done it right.'65 When asked if the
procedure Mr. Normandeau followed was normal, Mr. Freeman testified: "Yeah, very normal. I
wouldn't have done it any different."36
"30.

When Mr. Bundy was asked, '[W]ho, other than Mr. Normandeau would be

responsible for his accident?' He answered, 'Nobody I know."'

33

See Bundy dep., ex. 1, at 27:14-23.

34

See id. at 17:8-12; response toffl[5.c & 20, supra

35

See Freeman dep., ex. 2, at 67:17-68:1.

36

See id. at 68:7-15. See also id. at 69:5-6 ("He had done everything fine").
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Response:

Mr. Bundy's testimony was inadmissible. Counsel for the plaintiffs and

for International objected to this question on the grounds that it called for "rank speculation" and
for an expert opinion.37 Mr. Bundy also lacked foundation for his opinion.38
"31.

In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege only one theory of liability against

defendant Hanson Equipment for the negligent repair of the truck, which caused it 'to break
down under circumstances that required it to be towed.'"
Response:

The plaintiffs' amended complaint states three claims against all

defendants-strict products liaibility, negligence and breach of warranty.39

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS
The following additional facts are relevant to this motion:
1.

Kristen Marion, a reservist called up to active duty after September 11, had to

move her family from Gypsum, Colorado, to Washington state, where she was stationed. She
arranged to rent a Ryder truck for the move.40

37

Bundy dep., ex. 1, at 55:15-56:9.

38

See response to ^f 29, supra.

39

See Am. Compl. & Jury Demand at 9-12.

40

See Marion dep., ex. 5, at 5:1-3; 8:4-25.; 125:22-25.
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related to and focused on the possible negligence of my client,

2

to let it lie, because they didn't take care of their burden to

3 I establish testimony about him, and they still haven't, through
4

any proper expert testimony.

5

in this case.

6 I

Once she did —

I've got the only towing expert

and I still think that's my posi --

7

that's going to be my position at trial Judge, is that they

8

don't have any basis for putting him on the verdict form,

9

for faulting him.

They're trying to grab a hold of some

10

depo transcript statements that are out of context, without

11

foundation, without an expertise established.

12

not going to make it.

13

They're just

Now, if they do, I suppose that's a possibility, but I

14

don't think they could.

Therefore —

and that's why I didn't

15

designate them, your Honor, and I —

16

require me to —

17

and where she's now alleging, M Oh, he was negligent, and he's

18

the sole proximate cause," I thought it was incumbent on me, at

19

this point, even though she still hadn't designated an expert,

20

puts me in kind of rock and a hard place.

21

to pull this defensive expert out now and use him.

and the rules didn't

the scheduling order; but now with her motion,

I thought, I've got

22

THE COURT: Okay, and let's talk about the last one.

23

MS. MORGAN: Okay, your Honor.

Okay, I want to just

24

reiterate a few of the facts, just so it's a little clearer in

25

our mind about how all this whole thing happened.

-29On November 10th is when this —

1

of 2001 is when the

2

accident happened.

3

asked to repair the hydraulic line that controls the brakes and

4

power steering.

5

only, that this repair was done improperly.

6

is, even if it was done improperly, it was just not foreseeable

7

that this particular accident would have arisen out of this

8

out of that improper repair.

9

Two days before that, Hansen Equipment was

We are suing, for purposes of this motion

The repair was done.

What we're saying

—

Ms. Marion goes to rent the

10

truck.

11

She needs to head to Bremerton.

12

and she heads through Spanish Fork Canyon.

13

the canyon, she realizes she's losing power; and the truck's

14

failsafe mechanism begins to slow the vehicle and to pull it

15

over.

16 I

She's on her way to Washington.

She's been called up.

She loads up her Ryder truck
As she gets atop

She was able to pull it over off the side of the

17

road, you know, out of traffic, without a problem.

18

—

19

Washington.

20

this first tow truck driver, who comes.

21

hose.

22

me see if I can find it."

23

She calls

she's highly agitated, because she needs to be getting to
So she calls and asks for assistance.

They bring

He takes a look at the

Says, "Gosh, looks like we've got a bad hose here.

Let

Unfortunately, it was a Friday before a long weekend

24

—

or before a weekend, I guess, and he was not able to find a

25

replacement hose.

So he lets the folks at roadside assistance
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know that, and say, "Hey, you guys have got to send a bigger

2

wrecker, because mine's just too small for this."
So they send Kenworth, who sends Mr. Normandeau.

3
4

Mr. Normandeau gets to the scene.

He says, "What happened?"

5 I Mr. Freeman says, "Looks like the hose went out on this —
6

hydraulic line for the power steering and brakes.

7

to see it?" and the guy —

8

it.

9

the

Do you want

he says, "No, I don't need to see

Let's just get down to towing the vehicle."
Then —

and the one thing I wanted to point out to

10

your Honor, which I think is a good visual, because as I read

11

the moving papers again to prepare, it's not very clear.

12

Exhibit F, the very last photograph on Exhibit F shows the

13

drive line, and it's a very good picture which will help

14

demonstrate where it is.

On

15

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

16

MS. MORGAN: We've got the drive line, and then the

17

two axles.

18

where Mr. Normandeau is attempting to do the tow; and you can

19

see on that photograph the four bolts that he has to remove

20

from that drive line in order to remove it.

21

appreciate a little bit from that photograph the —

22

was on his haunches, having to get under there and do it.

23
24
25

There's the front and rear axle.

Does your have —

The rear axle is

You can kind of
that he

it should be a color photograph, the

last page of Exhibit F?
THE COURT: I have only black and white on my copy.
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2

MS. MORGAN: Oh, gosh.

Well, I'm —

may I approach,

your Honor?

3

THE COURT: Sure.

4 J

MS. MORGAN: This is my copy.

5

MR. KING: I got a black and white also.

6

MS. MORGAN: You got a black and white also?

7

MR. KING: Yeah.

8 I

MS. MORGAN: I apologize, I had no idea.

9

Did you get a copy?

your Honoi, you can use that one instead.

Here you go,

You can appreciate

10

from there where this is, is underneath the carriage, and it's

11

toward the back where he has to remove those four bolts that

12

connect the drive line to that rear axle.

13

simplified but that's basically the deal.

14

I mean, that's over-

He had undone two of the bolts, and as he reached over

15

—

16

reached over the drive line to get that third and fourth bolt;

17

and that's when the drive line smacked up and hit him m

18

head, and hit his head into the undercarriage of the truck.

19

That's what killed him, was that head to the head.

20

he reached his head over that —

he was on his haunches and

the

So after he'd undone the bolts, he hits his head.

The

21

tow truck driver says, "Gosh, did you cold cock yourself, kid,"

22

you know, not knowing what happened.

23

head, and realizes that he's dead.

24

called again from Kenworth to come and tow the truck; and he

25

doesn't know anything about a hose.

He catches the man's
Then, Mr. Jacobson is

All he knows is he's got a
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—

and the drive line is already disconnected, and he goes

2

ahead and continues the tow without incident.

3

The important thing that I think is critical for the

4

Court's determination on this issue is there's two main —

5

facts that the plaintiffs have stipulated to.

6

amended complaint in paragraph 37, it says that "Normandeau

7

had to disconnect the drive line, so as to not damage the

8

transmission."

9

two

First, in their

Their expert Rudy Limpert says the same thing in

10

his affidavit at paragraph 10.

This is important, because

11

Mr. Normandeau, to protect the transmission, had to do this

12

job.

13

how to properly do that.

As a tow truck driver, it was incumbent on him to know

14

The other paragraph that was admitted is our paragraph

15

No. 8 of the memorandum and opposition, which says that if the

16

drive line doesn't wiggle —

17

there and he was checking his drive line to see if there's

18

any tension built up, if it doesn't wiggle, there's no way to

19

know how much tension is built up, whether it's 100 pounds of

20

pressure, or 1,000 pounds of pressure.

21

It was incumbent on Mr. Normandeau to check that pressure build

22

up before he tried to disengage the drive line.

23
24
25

in other words, when he's down

There's no way to know.

THE COURT: Would you get Counsel a glass of water,
please?
MS. MORGAN: Oh, you know, I've got one.

I'm sorry.
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I'm just so use to coughing all week, I'm just used to it.

2

Thank you.

I have one, ma'am.

3

COURT CLERK: Oh, do you?

4

MS. MORGAN: Uh-huh.

5

COURT CLERK: Okay, well, I'll give you another one.

6

MS. MORGAN: Okay, thank you.

So I think those two

7

things are critical to know in this particulair case, is that's

8

what the tow truck driver needs to do when he gets there, is

9

he's got to disengage the drive line so he can tow the thing

10
11

away.
As you know, in a negligence case, they have to prove

12

duty, breach, causation and damages.

13

prove duty, and they can't prove causation.

14

to the duty, we —

15

relationship between the parties, to find out whether one

16

party owes a duty to another.

17

moving papers, there's no special relationship here.

18

no contractual relationship, fiduciary relationship, filial

19

relationship, anything like that.

20

In this case, they can't
With respect

there needs to be an analysis of the

As we talked about in our
There's

So then we have to look at other factors to determine

21

whether there's a duty owed.

We've pointed the Court to this

22

Amesol Industries case for the factors that Courts consider in

23

determining whether or not there is a duty owed.

24

to our citation, the only one that plaintiff's contest is the

25

foreseeability issue.

In response

There really aren't any other factors to
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consider in this case as to whether a duty was owed, except for

2

the foreseeability.

3

In this case, it would have been foreseeable to Hansen

4

Equipment when they —

5

the hose -- what they did to this power steering mechanism,

6

would cause it to fail.

7

hose on, or put one that was insufficient pressure or whatever,

8

it's going to fail; and that the vehicle would end up going

9

into self-preservation and pulling over to the side of the road

10
11

and if they do a negligent repair, that

So it's clear that if they put a bad

for the safety of its occupants.
What would have been foreseeable is if something had

12

happened to the occupants of that vehicle.

13

instead of being atop Soldier's Summit, if they had been on the

14

decline, and they didn't have control over the vehicle, and it

15

had run into another motorist, or if they —

16

tried to overcorrect, and crashed, if they had hit a parked

17

vehicle on the side of the road when the deal pulled over,

18

those are all foreseeable; but it is just too out of the realm

19

to think that a tow truck driver coming to the scene is not

20

going to be able to tow the vehicle.

21

If they had been --

if the driver had

Just because someone does a negligent repair that

22

causes a vehicle to pull over, doesn't translate into any tow

23

truck driver that comes along and doesn't do the tow right, is

24

going to be a foreseeable plaintiff.

25

this case.

It's just too remote in
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THE COURT: Wait a minute now.

2

MS. MORGAN: Yes.

3

THE COURT: —

4

—

it's foreseeable that the veihicle's

going to have to be towed.

5
6

If the hose fails

MS. MORGAN

No, it's —

it's not necessari.ly that it

would be towed, but that the hose would need to be repaired.

7

THE COURT: Okay.

8

MS. MORGAN

9

THE COURT: If you're out on the road someplace, and

So it would —

it -—

10

it' s a weekend or Friday night, and the hose fails, it's a good

11

possib ilit y that the vehicle's going to have to be towed.

12

MS. MORGAN

13

THE COURT: That's foreseeable.

14

MS. MORGAN

15

THE COURT: Okay, and it's also foreseeable in order

16

t O tOVvr

17

shaft.

18
19

Yeah, let's say

—

That is foreseeable.

this vehicle, that you've got to disconnect the drive

MS. MORGAN : Of any time you tow this vehicle, that
needs to be done.

20

THE COURT: All right.

21

MS. MORGAN : But there's a relationship

— it didn't

22

matter to the tow truck driver what the heck the problem was

23

with the -- the reason why it broke down.

24

is he' s got to tow the truck.

25

the hose or a flat tire or whatever.

A]1 the guy knows

Doesn't matter whether it was
He just know he's got to

-361

come and tow the truck.

So there's a big disconnect between

2

what Hansen could have foreseen with that repair and with the

3

tow truck driver.

4

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that it's foreseeable

5

that if the hose fails, the truck's going to have to be towed;

6

and it follows the night to day, if the truck's going to be

7

towed, you've got to disconnect the drive shaft, right?

8

MS. MORGAN: Okay, yes.

9

THE COURT: And it's also, it seems to me, foreseeable

10

that in disconnecting this drive shaft, because of the way it's

11

designed, apparently, that there could be substantial torque on

12

it.

13

MS. MORGAN: With any vehicle that one tows, they are

14

taught to check for the drive —

15

to check the drive line to see if there's torque built up in

16

it.

17

different than any other situation that he would have come

18

across.

That's with any vehicle that gets towed.

19
20

to wiggle the drive line, or

THE COURT: And you test for that because the torque is
a danger?

21

MS. MORGAN: Yes, that's right.

22

THE COURT: Okay.

23

So this is no

So that's foreseeable; the danger's

foreseeable.

24

MS. MORGAN: Well, I —

25

THE COURT: That's why we test the —

that's why we

-371 I wiggle it.
2

MS. MORGAN: It's foreseeable to a tow truck driver

3

when they come up -- from the tow truck driver's perspective,

4

it's foreseeable that they need —

5

tension in the drive line that they need to check and make sure

6

that that's been relieved before they tow the truck.

7

matter —

8

gets pushed over to the side of the road, or is incapacitated

9

for whatever reason, the tow truck driver knows that he needs

10

any truck that would —

that there may be built-up

Doesn't

like this Ryder truck that

to check that drive line.

11

What's not foreseeable is that a repairman on the

12

front end repairing the vehicle, is going to think that the

13

tow truck driver isn't going to do his job correctly, and

14

isn't going to check for the built-up torque.

15

this —

16

conditioning unit going out; and they call a handyman.

17

can't fix it; so they call the professionals to remove the air

18

conditioning unit off a roof.

19

conditioning unit falls off the roof and is injured.

20

it's not the responsibility of whoever made the faulty repair

21

in the first place.

22

not fall of the roof.

23

an analogy in the briefing.

I mean, we gave

It's like someone's air
He

The guy that removes the air
Well,

It was up to him to take precautions to

There was a case that we've cited, too, this Banzazine

24

case.

It's a motor vehicle case where two people are starting

25

to get agitated with each other as they're driving along the
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motor way; and one's getting behind the other and flashing

2

their brights, and then the other one's speeding up and get

3

in front of the other.

4

Well, the agitated —

one of the agitated drivers

5

pulls out a gun and shoots one of the occupants in the vehicle.

6

The Court found it's just too remote and unforeseeable that

7

someone would engage in road rage to the extent of pulling out

8

a gun and shooting someone.

9

It's foreseeable they might have been in a car

10

accident, they might have hit somebody else, each other, run

11

off the road; but that's just too remote of a possibility that

12

someone might pull out a vehicle and —

13

shoot somebody.

14

or pull out a gun and

I mean, it's kind of the same thing here.

If, you

15

know, some strange person came out of the woods and shot

16

Mr. Normandeau, I mean, that's unforeseeable that something

17

like that would happen.

18

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that in this case,

19

when that hose fails, we end up with a lock on the drive shaft;

20

and that can potentially be a very dangerous situation, and

21

it's caused —

22

The guy goes in.

23

maybe he isn't, I don't known, but anyway, he's killed by that

24

dangerous condition that exists because of the failure of the

25

hose.

that is caused by the failure of the hose.
He tries to fix it, and he may be negligent,
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MS. MORGAN: But

—

2

THE COURT: That's different from bringing in a totally

3

unconnected element like a person acting, as you've said.

4

The failure of the air conditioning unit doesn't create the

5

dangerous condition on the roof.

6
7

MS. MORGAN: Right, and just —

and the same would be

said for a Ryder truck like this.

8
9

Roofs are dangerous anyway.

THE COURT: But I don't agree with that.

It seems to

me that the dangerous condition is created by the failure of

10

the hose, which then clamps down on this, which forces the

11

equipment to clamp down on the drive shaft.

12

MS. MORGAN: No, the —

all the hose did was force the

13

vehicle off to the side of the road.

14

that might help.

15

Let me raise something

THE COURT: Well, I may not understand how it works,

16

but my understanding is that when the hose fails, and the

17

hydraulic fluid escapes

—

18

MS. MORGAN: Drained.

19

THE COURT:

—

that the equipment then clamps onto the

20

drive shaft.

21

a tension on it; is that right?

22

The drive shaft may or may not have at that point

MS. MORGAN: Yes, but the tortional energy is there.

23

There are many possibilities for why there might be this build

24

up.

25

because any time a tow truck driver comes to the scene, he has

That's why it doesn't really matter what the repair was,
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to check for this tortional built-up energy.

2

With respect to Rudy Limpert's affidavit that was

3

provided in support of defendant's motion —

4

it says that in this model, both the power steering and power

5

brakes are supplied from a single hydraulic pump.

6

brake system also uses hydraulic pressure from the same pump.

7

All three systems —

or our opposition,

The parking

that is, the brake boost, power

8

steering, and parking brake release, utilize the same hydraulic

9

fluid pump and reservoir.

A leak in any one of those system

10

components will render the vehicle without service brake, power

11

steering, and parking brake release.

12

There are many reasons that could have caused the

13

vehicle to pull over; and when Mr. Normandeau came to the

14

scene, he says, "What happened?" and the guy says, "Well, looks

15

like we got a bad hose here to the hydraulic line feeding the

16

power steering and the brake.

17

He's like, "No, I don't need to see it."

18

Do you want to see the hose?"

It's not even computing in —

for him that that's

19

something he needs to consider.

20

comes to the scene, he needs to check for any drive line build

21

—

22

what caused it to pull over or not, really doesn't matter to

23

Mr. Normandeau; and in this particular case didn't matter to

24

Normandeau.

25

He just knows always when he

any tork buildup in the drive line.

So whether this hose is

Another thing I wanted to touch on is that this
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foreseeability, it seems to apply not only to duty, but with

2

respect to causation.

3

Looking at the Banzazine case and Stephensen and the Reese

4

case that were cited, what is for —

5

is he general nature of the injury in order to hold Hansen

6

Equipment liable.

7 1

So let me move onto that as well.

what needs to be foreseen

In this case, the general nature of the injury was a

8

hit in the head to Mr. Normandeau. So we have to ask ourselves,

9

was it foreseeable to Hansen that Mr. Normandeau would hit

10

himself in the head by this built-up drive line —

11

in the drive line.

or torque

12

In this case, your Honor, it cannot be said that that

13

-- that kind of injury, that the general nature of that injury

14

was foreseeable.

15

an injury to"the occupants of the vehicle or other motorists on

16

the roadway.

17

quickly.

Again, what would have been foreseeable is if

I'm just going to just grab some water really

18

MR. KING: I'll get it for you.

19

MS. MORGAN: I'm going to IHC as soon as I'm done here.

20

THE COURT: So you're talking about injuries of the

21
22

people in the vehicle?
MS. MORGAN: Yes, that is what would have been

23

foreseeable.

That would have been of a general nature that

24

one would have expected to have happened, is something might

25

have happened to somebody on the roadway, because of this hose
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leaking and being pulled over to the side of the road.

2

I wanted to point out with respect to the affidavits,

3

we already talked about —

4

also wanted to point out that he's their brake expert; and he

5

says in paragraph 8, "This defective repair was the reason for

6

the subject truck breaking down and requiring towing services."

7

He doesn't say that there's any connection with the hose and

8

with the drive line being connected.

9

that when the repair was done incorrectly, that's what caused

10

we touched on Dr. Limpert's, but I

All he can recognize is

it to have to be pulled over.

11

Same with Mr. Andrews.

He says at paragraph 5, "An

12

experienced service shot for International Trucks, like Hansen

13

Equipment, should know that if it didn't properly repair or

14

replace the hydraulic hose, the truck would likely break down

15 I and have to be towed.
16

So what is foreseeable is that the truck would have

17

to be towed.

18

someone has to stay in a hotel to accommodate this darn thing

19

having to be fixed and repaired; but what's not foreseeable is

20

that the tow truck driver would come to the scene and not do

21

his job.

22

should have.

23

There might be a towing bill.

It might even be

He didn't check and wiggle the drive line like he

Because of that, your Honor, in plaintiff's amended

24

complaint, paragraph 59, their only claim against Hansen

25

Equipment is that the negligent repair caused it to break down
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under circumstances which required it to be towed.

That was

2

all.

3

related to the cost of a towing, but not to someone dying,

4

doing an improper tow.

What would be foreseeable would be things that might be

5

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. King, tell me why you think

6

—

or what facts there are here in this case that would support

7

a nexus between the loss of hydraulic fluid and the dangerous

8

torque situation existing.

9

MR. KING: Yes, sir, and that's an important thing,

10

because contrary to what Melinda's trying to fit this into,

11

the facts are —

12

of Mr. —

13

affidavits are uncontradicted, by the way —

14

that —

15

his deposition from I-Tech.

and they're established through the affidavits

of Dr. Rudy Limpert and Mr. Ron Andrews, and those
in which they say

and it's also supported by the testimony of Mr. Mink in

16

The hose, as Dr. Limpert points out, is a return hose

17

line from the drive line brake system up to the power steering

18

pump, and it failed. When there's a loss of pressure, hydraulic

19

pressure In the hose to the power to the drive line pump, it

20

automatically activates, by virtue of a very strong spring

21

in that, and the spring is held out by the hydraulic hose

22

pressure.

23
24
25

The hose

—

THE COURT: And then where does the pres —

where does

the spring activate; on the brake drums?
MR. KING: No, no, it activates right on the drive
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line.

Do you

—

2

THE COURT: So on the drive shaft itself?

3

MR. KING: The drive shaft itself.

4

THE COURT: So a failure in the hose, puts pressure on

5

That's right.

the drive line?

6

MR. KING: Yeah, the failure in the hose actually

7

causes —

while the vehicle's still moving, the power steering

8

access or assist is lost.

9

able to control the vehicle as well; and it causes the brakes

So it causes the driver to not to be

10

—

the drive line parking brake —

11

brakes, the parking brake —

12

turning drive line.

13

release that, as long as there's no hydraulic pressure.

14

that stays there, clamps down, and as that vehicle slows down,

15

that's where the tortional energy is imparted to the drive

16

line.

17

there's not the service

to clamp down on the moving

That stays there, and there's no way to

Contrary to suppose —

suppose —

and that's where

18

the built-up tension arises.

19

Dr. Rupert, Rudy Rupert said it's unseen.

20

he didn't see anything.

21

that this has 8,000 pounds of tortional energy.

22

So

This is also uncontradicted,
Mr. Freeman said

So you can't tell just by being there

There's an issue of fact there as to how much it

23

had.

No one knows.

A lot of times there's some minor amount

24

of tortional energy in these drive lines, and people like

25

Mr. Normandeau go ahead and sometimes they push it back and
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forth or do something to release any energy in there, sometimes

2

they don't.

3

Mr. Freeman said -- even though he usually didn't tow

4

vehicles this big, that he had done vehicles this big about 20

5

or 30 times; and he had no idea that that kind of energy could

6

be imparted or in a drive line.

7
8

THE COURT: So if I understand your theory, then, it's
foreseeable that the hose could fail?

9

MR. KING: Yes.

10

THE COURT: And it's foreseeable that if the hose

11

fails, that the vehicle will have to be towed.

12

to have to be towed, you have to disconnect the drive shaft,

13

which has now become a dangerous instrument because of the

14

torque?

15

If it's going

MR. KING: Yes, which danger, the extent and nature

16

specifically of the danger may or may not be appreciated by the

17

tow truck driver.

18

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

19

MR. KING: That distinguishes this case, your Honor,

20

from something like this.

Suppose Hansen's repair had not

21

been to that piece of equipment, to that hydraulic hose, but to

22

the service brakes that were, let's suppose, un —

23

unconnected or separate hydraulic system from the parking brake

24

and the power steering.

25

are down; and she pulls over.

totally

It has a light that says your brakes
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There would not have been, in that instance, any

2

tortional energy, or at least that amount of tortional energy

3

caused by the drive line parking, by clamping down on the drive

4

line.

5

may have been negligible, it may not have been there at all;

6

but it certainly wouldn't have killed him.

7

Whatever energy there would have been that stopped it,

If there had been a fuel line, a fuel pump failure and

8

the vehicle stopped, Mr. Normandeau still comes out and still

9

unhooks the drive line, if he's going to tow it, if he can't

10

fix it out there.

Still got to unhook the drive line, no

11

question about it; but there isn't that causal —

12

nexus to what the defendant's done at that point.

13

wouldn't have been that.

that causal
There

So this is a different situation.

14

THE COURT: Okay.

15

MR. KING: One other thing.

They had —

she has stated

16

a couple of times that it's maybe foreseeable that —

she's

17

admitted that in her brief at page 4, in a reply brief at

18

page 6 to 8, that there's a duty that she admits that her

19

client would have had if this had been Kristen Marion —

20

yeah, Kristen —

or

—

is that her name?

21

MS. MORGAN: Yes.

22

MR. KING: I think I said it backwards before, didn't

23

I?

Kristen Marion, the driver, or her passengers, or another

24

motorist coming by; or as she said here in Court today, if

25

she'd plowed into somebody, that those people all would have
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had actions back, duty-wise, and their client -- her client

2

would have had a duty to those people.

3 I

How she can say that, but deny that a serviceman who

4

comes out, who's presence is mandated, mandated, by the very

5

failure of the negligent repair, of the product that they

6

negligently repaired, there's no other way to get that vehicle

7

out of there except a tow truck driver.

8

who is going to be there.

He's the one person

9

THE COURT: Well, let me give you this hypothetical.

10

Suppose everything happened the way it happened, and the tow

11

truck driver comes up to tow the place, and he arrives at the

12

scene, and the back door of the tow truck pops open and hits

13

him in the head and kills him.

14
15

There would be no nexus.

MR. KING: I think that would be a much tougher case
for me.

16

THE COURT: Yeah, there's no nexus there.

17

MR. KING: Yeah, I think that's more like your —

18

think that's more like her example of the —

19

guy on the roof

THE COURT: Yeah.

21

MR. KING: —

22

THE COURT: That's what I —
but

of the roof, the

—

20

23

I

with the air condition.

Yeah, I agree.

that's what it seems to me

—

24

MR. KING: Yeah.

25

THE COURT: Okay, anything else that you want to add?
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MR. KING: One other thing, is that she said it's not

2

foreseeable to Hansen that the tower wouldn't do his job

3

correctly; but that's just not the law in this state.

4

you're talking about proximate cause, when you're talking about

5

foreseeablity as a matter of —

When

as a subsection of duty.

6

Duty is decided by the Court, as a matter of law.

7

I don't think there's an issue here that the jury needs to

8

decide.

9

Court, whether or not there's a duty.

This is —

ought to be decided by the Judge, by the
Then the factual issues

10

of was this a proximate cause; was there an intervening cause;

11

was Mr. Nonandos conduct an intervening cause?

12

appropriate instruction anymore, under these facts, under the

13

Liability Reform Act of 1986?

14

deal with later, but if there are any issues, those are factual

15

issues for the jury.

16

Is that even an

Those are issues that we can

Utah law is clear under Cruz vs. Middlecoff, and

17

it tracks other states, that the duty of an actor is not

18

removed simply because of conduct of a later actor that may

19

be negligent, even reckless, even criminal.

20

foreseeability; and the application of those principles of, is

21

this an appropriate extension of the actor's duty.

22

It's a matter of

This is clearly an appropriate extension of it.

23

This is an entity that was certified and approved by I-Tech,

24

International Truck, to work on its own trucks, this very kind

25

of truck; and they knew and are presumed to know the effects of

-491

their negligent repair.

So they knew this truck better than my

2 I tow truck driver did.
3 I
4

The fact that my tow truck driver —

let's assume he

was negligent, or even worse, that doesn't remove the duty.

5 I That would be an issue, then, under the comparative fault of
6

how much is he at fault and how much is neg —

7 I

One —

Hansen at fault.

the Cruz case, by the way, was a case in which

8

Middlecoff, Mercury or Ford or whoever they were, a dealer was

9

held respond —

liable —

subject to liability in a trial, and

10

a summary judgment was overruled, where they left the keys in

11

the car out in the parking —

12

cars.

13

there, and it had been burgled before, and they'd had people

14

run off with their cars.

15

out on the lot, the keys of their

It was fenced and whatever, but they left the keys in

Well, they still did it, and somebody stole a car,

16

drove off and hit or killed someone.

17

Middlecoff, and that proceeded to trial, because that duty

18

extended to people, even though the intermediary then was

19

committing criminal conduct.

20

Then that someone sued

Another good example of this is in our case, the

21

Bybee case -- I think that's case we quoted out of California

22

—

23

give lawyers —

24

the duty, it was found by the California Appellate Courts that

25

Pacific Tel's stationing of a phone booth right by a busy

vs. Pacific Tel, where —

this is one of those cases that

plaintiff lawyers a bad name, but in terms of
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highway would subject them to liability with a door that was

2

difficult to get out of if somebody was in that, and somebody

3

ran off the road, and in that case they were drunk and hit this

4

person in the phone booth.

5

Well, I mean you could argue that's ridiculous.

This

6

negligent, reckless or criminal conduct to run off the road;

7

but in that case the circumstances allowed and required that

8

to go to a jury, because the Court correctly found that there's

9

a duty of the actor, the first actor.

If there's certain

10

things that are foreseeable, because of the nexus of the facts

11

and the closeness in causation, that that duty is appropriate

12

to extend to those kinds of actors.

Thank you.

13

THE COURT: I'll give you the last word, Ms. Morgan.

14

MS. MORGAN: Thank you, your Honor.

I'll be brief.

15

What's important to remember is that the standard and the law

16

in Utah is that the general nature of this injury is what

17

needed to be foreseeable.

18

in the head from a drive —

19

line, which it could not have been foreseeable.

20

taught how to test for built-up —

21

and how to relieve it when he found it there.

22

This injury in this case was a hit
from built-up tension in the drive
Mr. Bundy was

for tension in a drive line,

The thing that plaintiff seemed to dispute, really, is

23

the amount of tortional stress that was built up in that drive

24

line, not that there already would have been built-up stress in

25

the drive line.

That's just something that he, as an everyday
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tow truck driver would have known to check for when he went.

2

It's important to know that he knew what the problem was with

3 I the vehicle when he got there.

He knew that the hose was

4

missing; and that there was a problem with the hydraulic hose

5

that controls the brake and power steering.

6

knew the situation that he was getting into.

7 I

So in this case he

THE COURT: Isn't this an argument for contributory

8

negligence?

9

you know, foreseeability.

10

I mean, I don't see that it goes to cause —

MS. MORGAN: Well, that's a good point.

to,

What I'm

11

trying to illustrate is that he understood that he, regardless

12

of the situation, and regardless of how much or how little

13

tension was built up in the drive line, he still needed to

14

check for the drive line.

15

So in other words, whether their argument of the hose

16

would have made it more stressful or not, I'm just saying in

17

this situation, he knew that there would have been tortional

18

stress anyway, whether or not the hose was there.

19

Also, with respect to the Cruz case, when someone

20

steels a car and then ends up hitting someone on the roadway,

21

that is foreseeable.

22

truck driver that came to tow the disabled truck wouldn't have

23

done the tow correctly, wouldn't have checked the drive line to

24

make sure that there was built-up stress.

25

Honor.

What wouldn't be foreseeable is the tow

So thank you, your
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THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Well, I think Counsel

2

have done a very good job in briefing and arguing.

3

ideal would be just not to able to —

4

thing, and just congratulate you and let you go; but I have to

5

decide.

6
7
8
9

So the

just no decision in this

MR. KING: It would be nice if all lawsuits could be
handled that way.

Then nobody would ever feel bad.

THE COURT: You've all done a great job.
all paid by the hour, and we'll see —

I hope you're

we'll see you later.

10

So first of all, with respect to apportioning the fault, what

11

I'm going to do is, I'm going to give Ms. Morgan an opportunity

12

to apportion the fault; but because I'm going to do that, there

13

may be some additional expert or other discovery with respect

14

to the employer only, not with respect to Mr. Freeman's

15

involvement.

16

I'm going to permit the expert witness that plaintiff

17

wants to have, Jesse Enriquez, but again, I'm going to give

18

you opportunity to challenge his credibility through his

19

qualifications and so forth. That may require some additional

20

discovery, deposition or whatever they want to do.

21

them that opportunity to do that as well.

22

On the motion for summary judgment

—

23

MR. KING: Your Honor?

24

THE COURT: Yeah?

25

MR. KING: I'm sorry to interrupt you.

I'll give
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THE COURT: Go ahead.

2 J

MR. KING: May I ask for one clarification on that?

3

THE COURT: Yeah.

4

MR. KING: We designated Mr. Enrique as an expert

5

solely as someone who might be named to defend the conduct of

6

Dennis Normandeau.

7

having —

8

employer as far as training of people in a diesel mechanic

9

shop or tewing.

10
11

We didn't know and didn't anticipate him

him being the person who might have to defend the

for leave of

He might be able to do that.

I'm just asking

—

THE COURT: Well, if he's the one, then you can present

12

whatever you're going to present in terms of a report, but

13

they're going to have full opportunity to cross -- you know, to

14

take his deposition and examine his qualifications.

15

MR. KING: I guess what I'm asking for is, if now in

16

looking at this, knowing that she is going to be blaming the

17

employer for training, if Mr. Enrique is not the appropriate

18

person for that, do we have leave to designate someone else?

19
20

THE COURT: I'll let you —

I'll let you designate.

I'm going to give you some deadlines here in a minute.

21

MR. KING: Whoever, okay.

22

THE COURT: I'll let you designate somebody else.

23

MR. KING: Thank you.

24

THE COURT: The motion for summary judgment, I think I

25

understand the defendant's argument.

I just feel that based on
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my understanding of the mechanics here —

2

not saying that I'm infallible on that, but based on my

3

understanding of mechanics, it just seems to me that the

4

failure of the hose exposes the tow truck driver who's got

5

to disconnect, if he's going to tow, the drive shaft, to a

6

hazardous situation.

7

even in part caused by the failure of the, you know, directly

8

caused by the failure of the hydraulics.

9

that —

10

and I don't, I'm

That hazardous situation, it seems, is

So I'm going to deny

the motion for summary judgment on that.
Now, we're looking at the end of January for trial.

11

So we've got, what, four months?

How quickly can you determine

12

whether you want to designate Mr. Enriquez or some other expert

13

on the employer issue?

14

MR. KING: What's today?

15

THE COURT: Today is the 12th of September.

16

MR. KING: Can we have until October 15th?

17

THE COURT: I think that's a little too long.

18

I think

we ought to cut it short by at least 10 days or so.

19

MR. KING: Okay.

I'm out of —

one reason I say that

20

is I'm out of town from the 24th of this month until this 1st or

21

2nd.

So

—

22

THE COURT: How about the 7th of Ocotber?

23

MR. KING: That —

24

THE COURT: I think that's a Friday.

25

MR. KING: All right.

okay.

I'll take that.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

EMILY NORMANDEAU, individually and
as guardian for ALEX THAYN, JACOB
THAYN and HANNAH NORMANDEAU,
minors, and LORI NORMANDEAU, as
guardian for DANIEL NORMANDEAU and
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INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND ENGINE
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HANSON EQUIPMENT, INC., a
corporation,

Judge John Paul Kennedy
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On September 12, 2005, the following motions came on for hearing and were argued
before the Court: Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment;
Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Notice of Intent to Allocate Fault to Third Parties;

W^hTL

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Notice of Intent to Allocate Fault; and
Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Jesse A. Enriquez.
Colin P. King and Paul M. Simmons represented Plaintiffs.

Charles H. Thronson

represented Defendant International Truck and Engine Corporation.

Melinda A. Morgan

represented Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.
After hearing argument of counsel, and having read the pleadings, exhibits and affidavits
filed by counsel, the Court HEREBY ORDERS:
1.

Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

2.

Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s request to allocate fault to the employer of Dennis
Normandeau is granted. Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s request to allocate fault to
Larry Freeman is denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Notice of Intent is
accordingly denied regarding Dennis Normandeau's employer, and granted
regarding Larry Freeman. Plaintiffs may designate an expert witness to opine
concerning the training and supervision provided by Dennis Normandeau's
employer.

3.

Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Jesse A. Enriquez is
denied. Plaintiffs may designate Mr. Enriquez as an expert, and defendants are
allowed to designate their own towing expert.

4.

Plaintiffs may have until October 7, 2005, in which to designate an expert to
testify regarding the conduct of the employer.
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Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. may have until October 21, 2005, in which to
designate towing and employer experts.
Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. shall depose the plaintiffs' additional expert
witness or witnesses by November 7, 2005.
Plaintiffs shall schedule the deposition(s) of Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s
expert(s) by November 10, 2005, and shall take these depositions on or before
November 23, 2005.
DATED t h i s c ^ Y day of ScptcntfiSr, 2005.
BY THE COURT
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5.

Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. may have until October 21, 2005, in which to
designate towing and employer experts.

6.

Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. shall depose the plaintiffs' additional expert
witness or witnesses by November 7, 2005.

7.

Plaintiffs shall schedule the deposition(s) of Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc.'s
expert(s) by November 10, 2005, and shall take these depositions on or before
November 23, 2005.

DATED this

day of September, 2005.
BY THE COURT
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36. What Is Negligence?
A person has the duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other
people or property. "Negligence" simply means the failure to use
reasonable care. Reasonable care does not require extraordinary caution
or exceptional skill. Reasonable care is what an ordinary, prudent,
person uses in similar situations.
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the
situation. You must decide what a prudent person with similar
knowledge would do in a similar situation. Some situations require
more caution because a person of ordinary prudence would understand
that more danger is involved. Less care is expected in situations such as
when the risk of danger is lower or when the situation happens so
suddenly that a person of ordinary prudence would not appreciate the
danger. Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act.
A person whose injuries or damages are caused by another
person's negligent conduct may recover compensation from the
negligent person for those injuries or damages.
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37. Right to Assume Proper Conduct by Others
A reasonably careful person may assume that other people (1) are
reasonably intelligent, (2) have normal sight and hearing, and (3) will
obey the law and be reasonably careful. However, a reasonably careful
person will not ignore obvious risks created by other persons.

\/J5=COo

38. Comparative Negligence
If you decide that more than one person or entity was responsible
for Mr. Normandeau's death, you must decide each person's percentage
of fault. "Fault" means a breach of legal duty and includes negligence.
This allocation of fault must be done on a percentage basis, and the total
must be 100%). Each person's percentage should be based on how much
that person's fault contributed to Mr. Normandeau's death.
If you allocate a percentage of fault to Mr. Normandeau, the
Plaintiffs' total recovery will be reduced by that percentage of fault. If
you decide that Mr. Normandeau's fault was 50% or more, the Plaintiffs
will recover nothing.
When you answer the questions about damages on the verdict
form, do not reduce any damages by Mr. Normandeau's percentage of
fault, if any. The Court will make that calculation later, based on your
findings as to the relative percentages of fault and the total damages.
For example, if you find that Mr. Normandeau's own fault was 20
percent of all fault proximately causing his death, then the Court will
reduce the Plaintiffs' recovery by 20 percent of the total damages found
by the jury. On the other hand, if you find that his fault is 50% or
greater, then the Plaintiffs shall recover nothing.

\^^U

39. Proximate Cause
A proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that
accomplish the injury. A proximate cause of an injury is that cause
which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury and
without which the injury would not have occurred. Another way to say
this would be that "but for" the cause, the injury would not have
occurred. Further, there must not be any extraordinary, unforeseen
intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation.
There may be more than one proximate cause of the same harm or
injury. If the negligence of two or more persons combines to produce an
injury, and the negligence of each of them is a proximate cause of the
injury, then the persons must share liability for the resulting injury, in
proportion their individual fault or negligence.

40. Product Liability.
In this case defendant Hanson Equipment claims defendant
International Truck & Engine Corporation is strictly liable for Dennis
Normandeau's death because it put a truck into commerce that had a
defective condition.
To find that International Truck & Engine Corporation is
strictly liable, you must find that Hanson Equipment showed by a
preponderance of the evidence that:
1. At the time it was sold, the truck had a defective
condition which made it unreasonably dangerous; and
2. International Truck & Engine is engaged in the business
of selling such trucks.
3. The proven defective condition was a proximate cause
of Mr. Normandeau's death.
A product is unreasonably dangerous when it is dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary and
prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in the Plaintiffs'
community, considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks,
dangers, and uses, together with any actual knowledge, training, or
experience possessed by the Plaintiffs.
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BILLINGS, Judge:
Hi
Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. (Hanson) appeals the jury
verdict in favor of Plaintiffs Emily Normandeau, individually and
as guardian for Alex Thayn, Jacob Thayn, and Hannah Normandeau,
minors; and Lori Normandeau, as guardian for Daniel Normandeau
and Melissa Normandeau, minors, on behalf of and for the benefit
of the heirs of Dennis Normandeau (Plaintiffs). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
%2
In early 2001, Dennis Normandeau started working as a
mechanic for Kemworth Sales Company, a diesel maintenance and
repair shop and towing service. In May or June 2001,
Normandeau 1 s duties were increased to include working as the
primary wrecking driver. Normandeau's supervisor at Kenworth
trained Normandeau for his new responsibility and taught him how
to use a large diesel wrecker.
%3
On November 10, 2001, Normandeau responded to a call for
roadside assistance after a Ryder rental truck broke down in
Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah County, Utah. The truck had a springapplied, hydraulically-released parking brake system. The
parking or emergency brake was on the driveline behind the
transmission and ran off the power steering unit. The truck
broke down because it had a leak in the power steering line,
which caused the parking brake to engage, preventing the
driveline from turning and causing torque to build up in the
driveline.
^[4
To tow the truck, Normandeau had to disconnect the driveline
from the transmission. As Normandeau was disconnecting the
driveline, the built-up torque released violently, causing the
differential yoke to break off. Either the differential yoke or
the driveshaft hit Normandeau in the head, killing him instantly.
%5
Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action, alleging that
Hanson had earlier repaired the truck negligently, which caused
it to break down. Plaintiffs 1 lawsuit also included
International Truck & Engine Corporation (ITEC), which was the
designer of the truck's hydraulic system, as well as other
companies associated with the design, manufacture, and lease of
the truck. All of the defendants except Hanson were dismissed
before trial.
%6
Prior to trial, Hanson filed a motion for summary judgment
on the grounds that Hanson owed no duty of care to Normandeau,
that Hanson's repair was not the proximate cause of Normandeau's
death, and that Normandeau was negligent in preparing the truck
for towing. The trial court denied Hanson's motion for summary
judgment, and the case went to trial. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. Hanson then filed a motion for a
new trial or, in the alternative, for a remittitur. The trial
court denied that motion, and Hanson now appeals.
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
f7
On appeal, Hanson first asserts that the trial court erred
when it denied Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Because the
issues presented to the trial court for summary judgment were
also presented to the jury at trial, we do not consider this
argument on the merits.
%B
Second, Hanson claims that the trial court erred when it
failed to instruct the jury regarding ITEC's negligent design of
the truck's hydraulic system, which caused the parking brake to
engage and resulted in the presence of torque in the driveline.
"We review challenges to jury instructions under a correctness
standard." Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998).
f9
Third, Hanson asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to strike Normandeau's untimely
designation of an expert witness who highlighted material issues
of fact in opposing Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Hanson
further argues that this error was compounded when the trial
court granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine to preclude
Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker from testifying at trial.
"Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases before
them . . . ." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen
Constr., 1999 UT App 87, % 11, 977 P.2d 518. Therefore, we
review whether a trial court properly ruled on pretrial
compliance with a scheduling order under an abuse of discretion
standard. See id. We also review the trial court's grant of
Plaintiffs' motion in limine under an abuse of discretion
standard. See Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237, % 12, 74 P.3d
635.
KlO Fourth, Hanson argues that Normandeau's counsel made
improper closing arguments at trial and that these improper
arguments warrant a new trial. " [T]he grant of a new trial is
ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court[;
therefore,] we . . . review the court's decision in this regard
under an abuse of discretion standard." Child, 972 P.2d at 429.
ANALYSIS
I.

Summary Judgment

fll Hanson first argues that the trial court erred when it
denied Hanson's motion for summary judgment. However, before we
reach the merits of this argument, we must decide, as a threshold
matter, whether we should entertain an appeal of the trial
court's denial of summary judgment after the case was
subsequently resolved by a trial on the merits.
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fl2 Generally, "[a] denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not a final determination on the merits and, therefore, is not an
appealable interlocutory order." Feiger, Collision & Killmer v.
Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Colo. 1996); see also Heuser v.
Schmittroth, 2002 UT App 42U (mem.) (per curiam) ("The denial of
a summary judgment motion is not final and appealable because it
leaves the case pending. Upon denial of [a] summary judgment
motion, [the losing party] ha[s] the burden to either try the
case or dismiss it. 11 ); Manuel v. Fort Collins Newspapers, Inc.,
631 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Colo. 1981) (noting that in "most . . .
jurisdictions[, ] the denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not a final order which may be appealed but is, rather, an
unappealable interlocutory ruling"). Some jurisdictions,
including Utah, will allow a denial of a motion for summary
judgment to be appealed, but only after the final judgment is
entered in the case. See Manuel, 631 P.2d at 1116; see, e.g.,
Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, 996 P.2d 1043 (reviewing
the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment).
However, "[i]n a substantial number of jurisdictions, . . .
reviewability is denied even after final judgment, particularly
where the case has gone to trial subsequent to the denial of the
summary judgment motion." Manuel, 631 P.2d at 1116.x A few
1. See also Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 476 n.5 (1st Cir.
1994); Black v. J.I. Case Co., 22 F.3d 568, 570-72 (5th Cir.
1994); Watson v. Amedco Steel, Inc., 29 F.3d 274, 276-78 (7th
Cir. 1994); Johnson Int f 1 Co. v. Jackson Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 19
F.3d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1994); Jarrett v. Epperly, 896 F.2d 1013,
1016 (6th Cir. 1990); Hollev v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft
Servs., 835 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1988); Locricchio v.
Legal Servs. Corp.. 833 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1987);
Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 669 (Fed Cir.
1986); Feiger, Collision & Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1247
(Colo. 1996); Phillips v. Abel, 233 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App.
1977) (holding a motion for summary judgment is moot after the
evidence has been reviewed in a trial on the merits); Evans v.
Jensen, 655 P.2d 454, 459 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (explaining that
a final judgment after trial should be tested upon the record
made at trial not at the time summary judgment was denied);
Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 174 (Iowa 2004) (holding that
after a full trial on the merits the denial of summary judgment
merges with the trial); Skowronski v. Sachs, 818 N.E.2d 635, 638
n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that no right to review exists
when case has proceeded to trial on the merits, unless the
summary judgment issue was on a different claim than was tried);
Cannon v. Day, 598 S.E.2d 207, 210 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
("Improper denial of a motion for summary judgment is not
(continued...)
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jurisdictions provide an exception to this principle and will
allow appellate review of a denial of summary judgment even after
a trial on the merits, but only if the motion for summary
judgment was based on a purely legal question.2
fl3 Utah case law suggests that we will entertain an appeal of a
denial of a motion for summary judgment only if it involves a
legal issue. In Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists,
Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322
(Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a denial of summary
judgment after a trial on the merits because the trial court "was
dealing with undisputed facts, [and its] denial of summary
judgment amounted to a ruling of law." Id. at 326. But in
Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 144 P.3d 1147, the Utah Supreme
Court declined to review a denial of partial motions for summary
judgment because "[a]t trial, [the moving party] had the
opportunity to fully litigate the issues raised in the summary
judgment motions." Id. H 19. Specifically, the moving party
"was allowed to present his evidence and argument on the issues."
Id. The supreme court reasoned that "[i]n appealing a summary
judgment ruling, only facts and legal theories that were
foreclosed from being addressed at trial may be heard on appeal."
Id. f 20. Thus, our case law suggests that only the legal issues
decided by the denial of summary judgment that prevented a party
from dealing with the issue at trial will be considered after a
trial on the merits.
Kl4 We conclude that the denial of the motion for summary
judgment is not appealable under prior Utah case law and the
facts of this case. The issue of proximate cause and negligence
were presented to the jury and decided against Hanson.
1. (...continued)
reversible error when the case has proceeded to trial and has
been determined on the merits by the trier of the facts . . . ."
(internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Ondrusek v. Murphy,
120 P.3d 1053, 1055-56 & n.2 (Alaska 2005) (reviewing a summary
judgment denial, but noting that although the Alaska Supreme
Court "has reviewed summary judgment denials" in the past, it
would "give serious consideration in the future to adoption of
what seems to be the majority view concerning reviewability of
summary judgment denials").
2. See, e.g., Wiles v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 173 F.3d 1297,
1301 (10th Cir. 1999); Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc.,
Ill F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1997); Regency Commercial Assocs.
v. Lopax, Inc., 869 N.E.2d 310, 320 (111. App. Ct. 2007);
Gallegos v. New Mexico Bd. of Educ. , 1997-NMCA-40, 1) 8, 123 N.M.
362, 940 P.2d 468.
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Certainly, the trial court did not err in declining to rule as a
matter of law that Hanson's negligence was not a proximate cause
of Normandeau's death. The issue of duty, though technically an
issue of law, is heavily fact-sensitive and is intertwined with
the issue of forseeability, which was also presented to the jury
and decided against Hanson. Indeed, Hanson "was accorded the
opportunity to fully litigate [its] case." See id. Finally, and
most importantly, there was nothing preventing Hanson from making
a motion to dismiss at trial on the issue of duty, thus
preserving this issue for appeal. "Consequently, the trial
court's . . . denial[] of . . . summary judgment resulted in no
prejudice[ and] did not affect the final outcome . . . ." Id.
Therefore, we do not review the denial of Hanson's motion for
summary j udgment.
II.

Jury Instructions

fl5 Hanson next argues that the trial court €>rred by refusing to
give its requested jury instruction regarding ITEC's negligent
design of the truck's hydraulic system. Hanson requested that
the jury be instructed on negligent design law and that ITEC be
listed on the special verdict form as a possible negligent party
and intervening cause. Hanson submitted Model Utah Jury
Instruction (MUJI) 12.16, which provides: "The manufacturer of a
product that is reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently
made has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design of the
product, so that the product may be safely used in a manner and
for a purpose for which it was made." However, the trial court
did not include MUJI 12.16 with the other jury instructions.
fl6 We review a challenged jury instruction in context with all
other jury instructions provided to the jury. See Jensen v.
Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, % 16, 977 P.2d 474. "'As
we have repeatedly held, if the jury instructions as a whole
fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error
does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing
alone, is not as accurate as it might have been.'" Id. (quoting
Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 741 (Utah 1996)) (citation
omitted). A party is entitled to have the jury instructed on its
theory of the case if competent evidence is presented at trial to
support its theory. See Van Erickson v. Sorenson, 877 P.2d 144,
151 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, it is not entitled to have
the jury instructed with any particular wording. See id. As
long as the instructions, read as a whole, fairly instruct the
jury on applicable law, it is not error to refuse a particular
instruction. See id. ("'[I]t is not error [for the trial court]
to refuse a proposed instruction if the point is properly covered
in the other instructions.'" (quoting State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d
643, 647 (Utah 1982))).
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fl7 Although MUJI 12.16 was not included in the set of
instructions given to the jury, the trial court provided
sufficient jury instructions regarding Hanson's claim that ITEC
was negligent. For example, in jury instruction 19, the trial
court told the jury that Hanson "claim[ed] that other persons are
responsible for . . . Normandeau's death, including [ITEC] (the
manufacturer of the Ryder truck)" and that Hanson "claim[ed] that
the negligence of these others was the cause of . . .
Normandeau's death."
Hl8

Further, jury instruction 22 read:
Although [ITEC] and Plaintiffs reached a
resolution of the issues between them in this
case, [ITEC] still remains as a Defendant in
this action. Thus, it will be your duty to
assess and allocate fault in this matter,
whether that allocation be against . . .
Normandeau and/or Hanson . . . and/or against
[ITEC] . . . .

And, jury instruction 23 told the jury that "[u]nless otherwise
stated, all instructions given [to] you govern the case as to
each Defendant. The mere fact that an accident or injury
occurred does not support the conclusion that any party was [at]
fault or negligent."
ill9 The trial court went on to define negligence and comparative
negligence without limiting those instructions to Hanson or
Normandeau, and without excluding ITEC. Jury instruction 38, on
comparative negligence, stated in part:
If you decide that more than one person
was responsible for . . . Normandeau's death,
you must decide each person's percentage of
fault. "Fault" means a breach of legal duty
and includes negligence. This allocation of
fault must be done on a percentage basis, and
the total must be 100%. Each person's
percentage should be based on how much that
person's fault contributed to . . .
Normandeau's death.
1(20

Finally, in jury instruction 45, the court told the jury:
Hanson . . . and [ITEC] are corporations
and, as such, can act only through their
officers and employees, and others designated
by it as its agents.
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Any act or omission of an officer,
employee, or agent of a corporation, in the
performance of their [sic] duties or within
the scope of the authority of the officer,
employees or agent, is the act or omission of
the corporation. So, if you find that the
preponderance of the evidence shows that an
officer, agent, or employee of a particular
corporation was negligent in performing his
duties or within the scope of this authority,
then you must find that particular
corporation was negligent.
1(21 These instructions, when read in context with the trial
court's other jury instructions, adequately informed the jury
that it could find that ITEC was at fault in causing Normandeau's
death if ITEC had acted negligently. Counsel for Hanson argued
to the jury that ITEC was negligent, and the jury rejected those
arguments. In answer to the specific question, "Was any fault on
the part of [ITEC] a cause of the death of . . . Normandeau?" the
jury answered, "No." Therefore, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in failing to include MUJI 12.16 in the set of
instructions provided to the jury because the other instructions,
taken as a whole, adequately instructed the jury regarding ITEC's
alleged negligence.
122 Hanson further argues that ITEC should have been listed as a
potentially negligent party on the special verdict form.
However, ITEC was listed as a potentially responsible party on
the special verdict form. Specifically, the special verdict form
asked the jury, "Was the Defendant [ITEC] strictly liable under
the facts of this case?" and "Was any fault on the part of [ITEC]
a cause of the death of . . ., Normandeau?" The jury answered
"No" to each of these questions. We acknowledge that ITEC was
listed as a party under a theory of strict liability, and not
specifically as a party under a theory of negligence. However,
because ITEC was included as a party on the special verdict form
and because the jury was asked the general question of whether
ITEC was the cause of Normandeau's death and the jury answered
"No," we conclude that any error in not listing ITEC as a
potentially negligent party was harmless.
III.

Untimely Designation of Expert Witnesses
and Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine

f23 Hanson also argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to strike Plaintiffs' untimely designation
of their towing expert, Jesse A. Enriquez, and that the trial
court erred when it granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine, which
sought to limit the opinion testimony of Normandeau's supervisor
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and co-worker. We conclude that both of these rulings were
within the trial court f s discretion.
f24 First, under the original scheduling order, the parties were
to exchange rebuttal expert witnesses by March 11, 2005. The
trial court later entered a new scheduling order that gave Hanson
until May 31, 2005, to designate its experts. The revised
schedule did not contain any date for rebuttal expert
designations, and Hanson did not designate any experts before it
moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs claim that Enriquez was a
rebuttal expert who was used to respond to Hanson's motion for
summary judgment. Upon receiving Enriquez's affidavit, served in
conjunction with Plaintiff's opposition to Hanson's motion for
summary judgment, Hanson moved to strike the affidavit on the
grounds that Enriquez was not timely designated as an expert.
After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Hanson's
motion and allowed Plaintiffs to designate Enriquez. It also
allowed Hanson to depose Enriquez and to designate its own towing
expert. Hanson then hired LaMar McQuaid, a towing expert, who
testified at trial on behalf of Hanson.
f25 We conclude that the trial court was within its discretion
to allow Plaintiffs to designate Enriquez as a towing expert and
to allow his testimony as a response to Hanson's motion for
summary judgment. "A trial court has necessary discretion in
managing cases by pretrial scheduling and management
conferences." DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1361
(Utah 1994); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 16 ("[T]he court, upon its
own motion or upon the motion of a party, may conduct a
scheduling and management conference."). "Because the trial
judge deals primarily with the parties and the discovery process,
he or she has great latitude in determining the most efficient
and fair manner to conduct the court's business." A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87,
1 36, 977 P.2d 518. This includes "discretion in determining
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants sanction,"
id., such as striking Enriquez's expert affidavit, see Utah Pep't
of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995) (recognizing
that "[t]he striking of pleadings . . . [is one of] the most
severe of the potential sanctions that can be imposed upon a
. . . party").
%26 Assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiffs' designation of
Enriquez as an expert was untimely and that Plaintiffs therefore
violated the scheduling order, Hanson was not prejudiced by any
such untimely designation because the trial court gave Hanson an
opportunity to depose Enriquez and to designate its own towing
expert. See, e.g., A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing, 1999 UT App 87,
il 37. Moreover, the designation of the towing experts came well
in advance of trial. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
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allowing Plaintiffs1 designation of Enriquez as a towing expert.
See id.
f27 Hanson further argues that the trial court erred when it
granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine, which sought to limit the
opinion testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker.
However, Hanson failed to provide an adequate record to enable
this court to review the trial court's ruling. In their motion
in limine, Plaintiffs argued that the trial court should preclude
Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker from expressing opinions
about the cause of and the responsibility for Normandeau's
accident. Plaintiffs asserted that Normandeau's supervisor and
co-worker were lay witnesses whose opinions were based on
personal perception, lacked foundation, required speculation,
stated legal conclusions, invaded the province of the jury, and
would not assist the trier of fact. Hanson responded by arguing
that Normandeau's supervisor and co-worker provided expert
testimony and that Plaintiffs are not prejudiced by these
individuals providing such expert testimony.
U28 On January 30, 2 006, a hearing was held concerning
Plaintiffs' motion in limine. However, the record before us
provides no transcript of that hearing. Instead, we are only
provided with the minutes, which state that a motion in limine
was argued and that "[t]he [c]ourt rule[d] as stated on the
record." This statement does not provide us with the facts the
trial court considered in making its ruling, the trial court's
basis for granting Plaintiffs' motion in limine, or the trial
court's findings and legal conclusions. The only information
concerning Plaintiffs' motion in limine that the record provides
is that the trial court did, in fact, grant Plaintiff's motion.
H2 9 If a party fails to provide an adequate record, we will
assume the regularity of the proceedings below. See State v.
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Moreover, we
note that "'a trial judge is accorded broad discretion in
determining how a trial shall proceed in his or her courtroom.'"
Tschaggenv v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, % 16, 163 P.3d 615
(quoting University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630,
633 (Utah 1987)). As such, we conclude that the trial court was
within its discretion when it granted Plaintiffs' motion in
limine regarding the testimony of Normandeau's supervisor and coworker. See id. (holding that "a trial court is free . . . to
alter a previous in limine ruling, . . . [and to] exercise its
discretion to disregard motions to reconsider prior in limine
rulings" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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IV.

Improper Closing Argument

i[30 Finally, Hanson argues that the trial court erred when it
denied Hanson's motion for a new trial because of allegedly
improper and prejudicial remarks Plaintiffs' counsel made in his
closing arguments. However, Hanson did not timely object to
these statements at trial. "Absent an objection by [a]
defendant, we will presume waiver of all arguments regarding the
appropriateness of counsel's statements unless the error falls
into the category of plain error." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839
P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992). Hanson does not argue plain error,
nor do we find any plain error regarding Plaintiffs' counsel's
closing argument. Therefore, we do not address Hanson's argument
that Plaintiffs' attorney made improper statements during closing
argument.
CONCLUSION
f31 Regarding Hanson's argument that the trial court erred in
denying its summary judgment motion, we conclude that such a
denial is not appealable under the facts of this case.
Therefore, we do not address it. We further conclude that the
trial court's jury instructions were proper and adequately
informed the jury of the law concerning Hanson's defense.
Moreover, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it allowed the designation of Plaintiffs' expert
and granted Plaintiffs' motion in limine. Finally, we do not
address Hanson's claim that Plaintiffs' counsel's closing
arguments were improper because Hanson failed to object to them
at trial.
^32

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

H33

I CONCUR:

James Z. Davis, Judge
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ORME, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
i[34 I concur in the balance of the opinion, but I disagree with
my colleagues that there is appellate jurisdiction over only some
denials of summary judgment. I believe that once a final
judgment has been entered, we have jurisdiction over appeals
questioning the denial of a motion for summary judgment
regardless of the basis for the denial, although I recognize that
such appeals will ordinarily be for naught as a practical matter.
^35 Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, Utah
recognizes that when a party complies with rule 3(d) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and designates the final judgment
in its notice of appeal, it is "not precluded from alleging
errors in any intermediate order involving the merits or
necessarily affecting the judgment as long as such errors were
properly preserved.1'1 Zion's First Nat' 1 Bank v. Rocky Mountain
Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1997). On the
contrary, "[w]hen an appellant files a notice of appeal from a
final judgment, he may, in his opening brief, challenge all
nonfinal prior orders and happenings which led up to that final
judgment." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Professors Wright and Miller specifically recognize that this
familiar precept applies to denials of summary judgment. See 10A
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2715, at 264-66 (3d ed. 1998)
1. I readily agree with the majority that a denial of summary
judgment, an intermediate order, is not immediately appealable as
a matter of right. See Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, % 20 &
n.13, 144 P.3d 1147. While a party may petition to have the
denial considered on interlocutory appeal, it is not required to
do so. See generally Utah R. App. P. 5(a). Utah has a long
history of discouraging piecemeal appeals and favoring a single
appeal from a single action, see, e.g., Anderson v. Wilshire
Invs., LLC, 2005 UT 59, % 9, 123 P.3d 393; Miller v. USAA Cas.
Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, % 68, 44 P.3d 663; Kennedy v. New Era
Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 1979); O'Qara v. Findlay, 7
Utah 2d 218, 321 P.2d 953, 953-54 (1958), and only rarely will an
interlocutory appeal be granted from the denial of a summary
judgment motion. When leave is not sought or when it is sought
but denied, the question of whether the intermediate order was
erroneous does not vaporize but is simply pushed forward for
possible consideration after the entry of final judgment.
Adherence to this precept both serves the policy in favor of one
appeal per case and assures litigants there is no need to seek
appeal of every intermediate disposition along the way, as their
right to fuss about such dispositions will be fully preserved for
appeal following the entry of final judgment.
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("[After] entry of judgment following the trial on the merits,
. . . the party who unsuccessfully sought summary judgment may
argue that the trial court's denial of the Rule 56 motion was
erroneous.") (footnotes omitted).2
f36 What I have said goes only to jurisdiction--to the power of
an appellate court to consider all interlocutory orders on appeal
from a final judgment, including interlocutory orders denying
summary judgment motions. I do not mean to suggest that such
challenges are likely to be successful. Indeed, as a practical
matter, it will be hard for a party to argue entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law when judge or jury, having heard all
the evidence and seen live witnesses, actually awarded judgment
to the other side. In such a case, the appealing party is
fighting an impossible battle in the absence of a mistake of law
impacting the judgment entered. Even in the case where denial of
a summary judgment motion turns exclusively on a legal issue, it
will ordinarily be more efficient to reassert that legal issue in
the context of a motion to dismiss at the close of the
plaintiff's case, a motion for directed verdict, a challenge to
the trial court's instructions to the jury, etc.--and to seek
2. The majority relies upon Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, 144
P.3d 1147, in concluding that in Utah "only the legal issues
decided by the denial of summary judgment that prevented a party
from dealing with the issue at trial will be considered after a
trial on the merits." Lead Opinion H 13. In Wavment, the Utah
Supreme Court held that "only facts and legal theories that were
foreclosed [by a summary judgment ruling] from being addressed at
trial may be heard on appeal," 2006 UT 56, \ 20 (emphasis in
original), but it cited no authority in support of that
pronouncement, it did not characterize the limitation as
jurisdictional, and it did not cross-reference the general rule
set forth in Zion's First National Bank v. Rocky Mountain
Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142 (Utah 1997), which I quote in % 35
of this opinion. Thus, it seems entirely possible that the Court
had in mind the same kind of practical inefficacy of such a
challenge on appeal that I readily recognize, rather than a true
jurisdictional bar.
The majority also relies upon Estate Landscape & Snow
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), where the Supreme Court
did review a denial of summary judgment, see id. at 325-31, but
such reliance is misplaced. The Supreme Court's only relevant
references were with respect to its determination of the
appropriate standards of review. See id. at 326 ("Because he was
dealing with undisputed facts, [the trial judge]'s denial of
summary judgment amounted to a ruling of law, which we review for
correctness[.]").
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appellate consideration of the trial court's pertinent rulings-than to overtly challenge the trial court's earlier denial of
summary judgment. But such barriers to success on appeal from a
denial of summary judgment are practical, not jurisdictional.
Accordingly, I believe that Hanson was free to raise its
challenge to the trial court's denial of its motion for summary
judgment and that we are obliged to consider that challenge on
its merits, such as they are.
i|37 On the merits, I cannot say that the trial court erred in
denying Hanson's summary judgment motion. Hanson's moving papers
failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Hanson owed no duty
of care to Normandeau, that Hanson's repair did not proximately
cause Normandeau's death, or that Normandeau was negligent in
preparing the truck for towing. Accordingly, the trial court
ruled correctly in denying the motion.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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WILKINS, Justice:
fl Plaintiff Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler ("Prince Yeates" or "the
firm") appeals the district court's denial of the firm's motion for
summary judgment on defendant Robert S. Young's counterclaim for
breach of express contract and its grant of partial summary judgment
to Young on the firm's breach of fiduciary duty claim. We reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
%2 In April 1995, Prince Yeates hired Young as an associate
attorney. Previously, Young had spent the majority of his twelve-year
legal career as general counsel for Rocky Mountain Helicopters, where
he acquired considerable experience in helicopter crash litigation.
Prior to joining Prince Yeates, Young met with John Ashton, the
firm's then-president, to discuss compensation. Under the terms of
his original employment agreement, which was never reduced to
writing, Young accepted a starting salary of $70,000 per year. During
their discussions, Ashton also indicated to Young that the firm would
evaluate his performance after the first year and that, as a general
rule, attorneys at Prince Yeates typically received increased
compensation based on performance and positive results. In addition,
with respect to becoming a shareholder, Ashton told Young that,
depending upon his performance, the usual partnership track for a
lateral hire with Young's experience ranged from two to three years.
f3 In 1996, Young agreed to represent Charles Krause, who had
sustained serious injuries in a helicopter crash, in a personal
injury action in Texas. At approximately the same time, Young also
undertook the representation of Mountain West Helicopters, the owner
of the helicopter involved in Krause's accident, in a related lawsuit
filed in federal court in Utah. As well as being the originating
attorney, Young was the only lawyer at Prince Yeates who performed
any work on either case.
f4 For the next two years, Young spent considerable time on these
two contingent fee cases, which resulted in lower collections and
higher work-in-process figures compared to other Prince Yeates
attorneys. As a result, some members of the firm began to question
Young's overall profitability and readiness to become a shareholder.
In September 1998, perhaps sensing this tension, Young inquired as to
how the contingent fee in the Krause case (assuming a successful
outcome) would be divided between himself and Prince Yeates. The
firm's Board of Directors ("the Board") responded by assigning Ashton
and John Chindlund, Prince Yeates1 then-president, to explore the
possibility of reaching an agreement with Young on the Krause fee.
%5 Between December 1998 and May 1999, Ashton and Chindlund met
with Young on several occasions to negotiate an appropriate
allocation of the Krause fee. Throughout these meetings, both Prince
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Yeates (represented by Ashton and Chindlund) and Young communicated
their intention to be "fair" with each other in attempting to
determine the amount of "fair and equitable" compensation that Young
would receive from the Krause fee. Ultimately, the two parties
reached a tentative verbal agreement under which Young would take
one-third of the Krause fee, with the remaining two-thirds going to
the firm. On May 5, 1999, Chindlund memorialized this proposal in
writing and requested that Young sign it to acknowledge his
acceptance. Young did not sign.
%6 On June 14, 1999, Young learned that the Krause case had
settled three days earlier at a mediation in Texas, which he did not
attend, and that the contingent fee recovery would be nearly
$650,000. The following day, June 15, without disclosing his
knowledge of the settlement to his employer, Young made a
counteroffer to the firm's May 5 proposal. In his counteroffer, Young
agreed to divide the Krause fee one-third to himself and two-thirds
to the firm, provided Prince Yeates made him a shareholder, allowed
him a voice in that year's bonus distribution, and guaranteed an
increased salary for the next two years. According to Young, over the
course of their numerous meetings, Ashton and Chindlund promised him
that the firm would fulfill these additional conditions upon the
successful resolution of the Krause case. Ashton and Chindlund denied
making such promises, and the firm did not respond to Young's
proposal. Finally, on July 2, Young wrote a memo to the Board,
informing them that he would leave Prince Yeates in two weeks if an
agreement could not be reached on his counteroffer. The firm accepted
Young's resignation on July 7.
i|7 After his departure, Prince Yeates learned that Young had
represented certain clients during 1998 and 1999 without disclosing
the representation to the firm, while simultaneously using firm
resources and filing pleadings in the firm's name in connection with
these matters. In addition, Young retained all fees derived from
these cases for himself. Prince Yeates then filed suit against Young
for breach of fiduciary duty, and Young counterclaimed alleging,
among other causes of action, breach of oral contract. The firm twice
moved for summary judgment on Young's counterclaim, and the district
court denied both motions with respect to the contract claims. Prince
Yeates and Young also each moved for partial summary judgment on the
breach of fiduciary duty claim. The district court denied the firm's
motion, granted Young's, and the case proceeded to trial.
f8 At trial, the special verdict form asked the jury to determine
if Young "was entitled to additional compensation as a result of the
Krause fee either under his original oral employment contract or a
valid contract with regard to the helicopter cases." The jury
answered in the affirmative and determined that $280,000 represented
"the fair and reasonable amount of the fee" owed to Young.
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%9 On appeal, Prince Yeates challenges (1) the district court's
denial of its two summary judgment motions on Young's breach of
contract counterclaim; (2) the district court's grant of partial
summary judgment to Young and denial of partial summary judgment to
the firm on its breach of fiduciary duty claim; (3) the district
court's denial of Prince Yeates' motion for a directed verdict on the
counterclaim; (4) the sufficiency of the evidence presented by Young
to support the jury verdict; and (5) the district court's refusal to
allow the firm to introduce evidence of Young's competing law
practice. On cross-appeal, Young asserts that the district court
erred when it denied his post-trial request for attorney fees,
expenses, and prejudgment interest. Because the case is fully
resolved by our analysis of the district court's summary judgment
rulings, we do not address the other issues raised.

ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
tlO We review the district court's rulings on summary judgment
motions for correctness. Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc.,
2000 UT 71,fl14, 10 P.3d 338; see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In the
context of cross-motions for summary judgment, we examine each motion
separately, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Surety
Underwriters, 2000 UT 71 at f 15.
II. BREACH OF EXPRESS CONTRACT
fll Young asserts that Prince Yeates entered into two separate
express contracts with him: (1) the original 1995 oral employment
agreement; and (2) the discussions between Ashton, Chindlund, and
Young regarding the "fair and equitable" division of the Krause fee.
We review each in turn.
A. The Original Employment Agreement
1[l2 Under the terms of his original oral employment agreement,
Young accepted Prince Yeates' offer to become an associate attorney
at a starting salary of $70,000 per year. In previous conversations,
Ashton indicated to Young that, as a general rule, attorneys at the
firm typically received increased compensation based on performance,
and that the usual shareholder track for a lateral hire with Young's
experience ranged from two to three years. Although nothing was ever
reduced to writing, Young claims that these representations created
an express contract under which Prince Yeates agreed to pay him
additional compensation contingent upon positive performance. Young
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then argues that his recovery of the Krause fee constitutes
contractual performance sufficient to warrant increased remuneration.
We disagree.
fl3 In Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, we noted that ,!la meeting of the
minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the
formation of a contract'" and, consequently, "'[a]n agreement cannot
be enforced if its terms are indefinite.1" 2003 UT 37, f 11, 78 P.3d
600 (quoting Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah
1996)) . Here, Ashton and Young discussed the general relationship
between performance and compensation at Prince Yeates. At no point in
these conversations did Ashton represent to Young that the firm would
pay him a specific amount of additional compensation in the future,
or that Young was guaranteed to become a shareholder. Furthermore,
Ashton never provided, nor did Young ask for, clarification on what
exactly constituted "performance" sufficient to trigger increased
compensation. Rather, Ashton merely communicated Prince Yeates' usual
practice; namely, that as a general rule, attorneys at the firm
typically received additional compensation if they performed well.
fl4 Without some definite language addressing the amount, timing,
or conditions of Young's potential additional compensation, Ashton1s
comments represent "only the facade of a promise, . . . statement[s]
made in such vague or conditional terms that the person making [them]
commits himself to nothing." Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch &
Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). Such statements
"neither bind[] the person making [them] . . . nor function[] as
consideration for a return promise." Id. In short, "where there was
simply some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be
entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of a
contract the parties ought to have made and enforce it." Valcarce v.
Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Utah 1961) . Therefore, based upon the
uncontested material facts viewed in the light most favorable to
Young, we hold as a matter of law that Ashton's broad, indefinite
statements to Young pertaining to the general relationship between
performance and compensation did not create an express contract
binding Prince Yeates to pay Young greater compensation, or advance
him to shareholder status. As a result, the district court erred when
it denied Prince Yeates summary judgment on Young's counterclaim.
B. The Krause Fee Discussions
fl5 In addition, Young also contends that Prince Yeates entered
into a second express contract when Ashton and Chindlund communicated
the firm's intention to be "fair" in negotiating the amount of "fair
and equitable" compensation that he would receive from the Krause
fee. Again, we disagree.
fl6 Like his earlier argument on the original employment
agreement, Young's claim fails because the firm's statements
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regarding the anticipated "fair and equitable" division of the Krause
fee were too indefinite to create an express contract. Our prior
jurisprudence clearly establishes that a contract cannot exist
without a meeting of the minds on the central features of the
agreement. See Nielsen, 2003 UT 37 at f 11; Tsern, 928 P.2d at 373.
Simply stated, "[a] condition precedent to the enforcement of any
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties,
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with
sufficient definiteness to be enforced." Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428.
fl7 Here, although Prince Yeates and Young each expressed their
intention to allocate the Krause fee in a "fair and equitable"
manner, no agreement was ever reached on the integral feature of the
alleged contract--Youngfs compensation. Other than the tentative onethird/ two-thirds division outlined in Chindlundfs May 5, 1999 memo,
which Young expressly rejected with his counteroffer, the parties
never agreed upon the specific amount of, or formula to determine,
Young's share of the Krause fee. In the absence of any consensus on
actual numbers or adoption of a mutually satisfactory method of
calculating "fair and equitable" compensation, Prince Yeates1 stated
desire to be "fair" to Young, standing alone, is too indefinite to
create a contractual obligation. "So long as there is any uncertainty
or indefiniteness, or future negotiations or considerations to be had
between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact,
there is no contract at all." Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101, 1102
(Utah 1926). See also Tsern, 928 P.2d at 373-74 (noting that "when
parties have not agreed on a reasonable price or a method for
determining one, 'the agreement is too indefinite and uncertain for
enforcement'" (quoting 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 4.3
(rev. ed. 1993))). Other jurisdictions also take this approach. See
Freedman v. Pearlman, 706 N.Y.S.2d 405, 407-08 (App. Div. 2000)
(holding that "alleged promises . . . to provide 'fair compensation'
and to 'equitably' divide the draw were too indefinite to be
enforced"); Turcott v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 179 A.2d 491, 492-93 (R.I.
1962) (same).
fl8 In sum, Prince Yeates' commitment to be "fair" to Young in
attempting to determine his "fair and equitable" compensation from
the Krause fee was too indefinite to create an express contract.
Again, viewing the material facts in the light most favorable to
Young, we reverse the district court and hold, as a matter of law,
that Prince Yeates was entitled to summary judgment on Young's
counterclaim.
III. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
^Jl9 Prince Yeates next argues that Young breached his fiduciary
duty of loyalty--specifically, a duty of non-competition--when he
represented clients in the firm's name without disclosing the
representation to the firm, expended firm resources and filed
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pleadings in the firm's name in connection with these matters, and
retained all fees derived from these cases for himself. x' The
district court denied Prince Yeates' motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of liability and granted Young's cross-motion,
reasoning that, as a mere employee, he owed no fiduciary duty of noncompetition to the firm. Once more, we disagree.
f20 As a general matter, the second Restatement of Agency provides
that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty not to
compete with the principal concerning the subject matter of his
agency." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 393 (1958). Furthermore,
"[t]he rules as to the duties and liabilities to the principal of
agents who are not servants [also] apply to servants." Id. at § 429.
While the Restatement does not specifically include "employees" as
"agents," it does refer to "servants," a term synonymous with
"employees." See Black's Law Dictionary 1372 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
"servant" by pointing to the definition of "employee").
f21 Although this court has not directly addressed the issue of
whether "mere employees" owe their employers a fiduciary duty of noncompetition, other jurisdictions have. In Fryetech, Inc. v. Harris,
the defendants argued that the fiduciary duties of good faith and
loyalty did not apply to "mere employees." 46 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1152
(D. Kan. 1999). The court rejected this contention, emphasizing that
"[w]hile most of the cases which have addressed the fiduciary
responsibilities of agents . . . have involved corporate directors or
officers, there is no basis for concluding these are the only types
of agents subject to fiduciary duties." Id. Rather, "the cases speak
of the duties of agents without respect to their exact status." Id.;
see also Bessman v. Bessman, 520 P.2d 1210, 1217 (Kan. 1974) ("An
agent or employee of another is prohibited from acting in any manner
inconsistent with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to
exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of his
duties." (internal quotations omitted)); Chernow v. Reyes, 570 A.2d
1282, 1283, 1284 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that even
though an employee's oral employment contract did not specifically
prohibit competition, "[a]n employee owes a duty of loyalty to the
employer and must not, while employed, act contrary to the employer's
interest," which necessarily includes "a duty not to compete with the
employer's business").
i|22 In response, Young cites Microbiological Research Corp. v.
Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981), ostensibly for the proposition that,
under Utah law, "mere employees" owe no fiduciary duties to their
employers. Young misreads Muna. This court in Muna noted that when a
corporate officer no longer serves in that capacity due to
resignation or removal, but remains as an employee, the fiduciary
relationship may cease, depending on the factual circumstances. 625
P.2d at 695. However, it is incorrect to conclude, as Young does,
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that this observation somehow inevitably leads to the conclusion that
employees necessarily have no fiduciary duties to their employers.(2)
That is not the case. Moreover, Young cites no additional applicable
law from this or any other jurisdiction.
%22 In the relationship of a lawyer and his or her employer, there
does exist a duty of honest and ethical behavior. Because of the
privilege granted to engage in the practice of law, we impose upon
members of our bar a fiduciary duty that encompasses the obligation
to not compete with their employer, which we define as any law firm
or legal services provider who may employ them in a legal capacity,
without the employer's prior knowledge and agreement.
f24 We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that the district court
erred in denying Prince Yeates' motion for partial summary judgment
on its breach of fiduciary duty claim and in granting Youngfs crossmotion. To hold otherwise would imply that attorneys are free to join
law firms, derive benefits from that association, and essentially
operate as sole practitioners while simultaneously receiving a salary
and using firm resources for their independent legal activities. If
Young was unhappy at Prince Yeates, he was free, as an at-will
employee, to leave at any time and presumably take those clients who
wished to follow him. Merely because he was afraid that his interest
in the Krause fee would be jeopardized does not justify his nondisclosure of representation and subsequent retention of fees. He had
a higher duty to Prince Yeates than that. With that in mind, we now
turn to the question of the firm's remedy.
IV. REMEDY
f25 Regarding an appropriate remedy, Prince Yeates urges us to
require the forfeiture of both Young's share of the Krause fee
(determined by the jury to be $280,000) and all compensation paid by
the firm to Young from January 26, 1998 through July 7, 1999--the
time period during which Young breached his fiduciary duty of noncompetition. To support this argument, Prince Yeates cites several
cases from other jurisdictions where courts imposed total forfeiture
upon disloyal employees. See, e.g., Bon Temps Agency Ltd. v.
Greenfield, 584 N.Y.S.2d 824, 825-26 (App. Div. 1992); Vendo Co. v.
Stoner, 321 N.E.2d 1, 14 (111. 1974).
%2G Although we acknowledge that total forfeiture may be proper in
certain circumstances, we decline to implement such a harsh remedy in
this case. Given that the number of undisclosed clients and the
amount of retained fees were comparatively small, Young's conduct,
while unquestionably giving rise to liability, does not warrant so
punitive a sanction. Moreover, with our reversal today of the summary
judgment rulings already described, Young has no share of the Krause
fee to forfeit, due in no small part to Young's own lack of honesty
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and candor with Prince Yeates when the Krause case was settled.
However, we do hold that the appropriate remedy for Young's breach of
fiduciary duty is the disgorgement of the fees charged and collected
by Young while employed at the firm but not previously paid over to
Prince Yeates. As such, we remand this issue to the district court,
with instructions to determine the amount of those fees and order
their payment to the firm forthwith.
CONCLUSION
%21 We reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment to
Prince Yeates on Young's counterclaim for breach of express contract.
With respect to the original employment agreement, we hold that
Ashton's statements to Young addressing the general relationship
between performance and compensation were too indefinite to create an
enforceable contract term. Likewise, Prince Yeates1 commitment to be
"fair" to Young in determining his "fair and equitable" compensation
from the Krause fee was similarly indefinite, and therefore
insufficient to give rise to an enforceable contract.
f28 Secondly, we reverse the district court's denial of the firm's
partial summary judgment motion on the issue of liability for breach
of fiduciary duty, and its attendant grant of Young's cross-motion.
We hold that Young breached his fiduciary duty of non-competition
when he represented clients without disclosing the representation to
Prince Yeates, expended firm resources and filed pleadings in the
firm's name in connection with these matters, and retained all fees
derived from these cases for himself. As such, we further hold that
the appropriate remedy for Young's breach is the disgorgement of
those ill-gotten fees to Prince Yeates. We reverse and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

f2 9 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice
Parrish, and Judge Mclff concur in Justice Wilkins' opinion.
1f30 Having disqualified himself, Justice Nehring does not
participate herein; District Judge K. L. Mclff sat.
1. In addition, by invoking Prince Yeates' name, Young also
effectively made the firm liable for any professional liability
arising from the representation.
2. We need not, and do not, decide today whether all "mere employees"
owe fiduciary duties to their employers to not compete with the
employer's legitimate business interests.
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NEHRING, Justice:
%1 When Ali Yazd and Parvin Yousefi's Lindon, Utah home
sank into the unstable soil upon which it lay, they sued. They
claimed that home-seller Woodside Homes fraudulently concealed
information contained in a report, the "Delta report," about a
deep layer of collapsible soil present on land that Woodside
owned adjacent to the Yazd-Yousefi property.
%2 The district court granted Woodside's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the Yazd-Yousefi fraudulent
concealment claims. It based its ruling on the undisputed fact
that Woodside was unaware of unsuitable soil conditions either on
the Yazd-Yousefi land or elsewhere in its development. The court
of appeals reversed.
%3 We granted certiorari. We affirm the court of appeals'
reversal of summary judgment. However, we reverse the court of
appeals' holding that the Delta report was material as a matter
of law. We also correct the court of appeals' misapprehension

that the materiality of the Delta report is relevant to whether
Woodside owed the homeowners a duty to disclose the contents to
them. Finally, we hold that a developer-builder may owe his
buyer a duty to disclose information known to him about the
composition or characteristics of any real property when that
information is material to the suitability of the property
purchased by the buyer.
BACKGROUND
f4
In the early 1990s, Woodside undertook the development
of the Panorama Point subdivision in Lindon, Utah. The
subdivision included three parcels of land, the last of which was
purchased in 1992 from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, which we will call the "Church." The Church had intended
to construct a large structure on the property. The Church
abandoned this plan, however, after the Delta report (named after
the firm which compiled it) revealed that an excess of moisturesensitive collapsible soil made the site unsuitable for the
contemplated building. The Delta report did not specifically
evaluate the suitability of the site for a single family
residence.
f5
The Church agreed to sell the parcel of property to
Woodside. According to the sales contract, the Church was to
provide a copy of the Delta report to Woodside. Woodside claims
it never saw the report.
f6
Before the Yazd-Yousefi home was built, Woodside
obtained its own study of the soil conditions on two other
parcels that comprised Panorama Point. The Yazd-Yousefi lot was
within the area covered by the study. The soil study indicated
the presence of collapsible soil to an average depth of
approximately two and one-half feet. Accordingly, Woodside
formulated a plan to dig out the collapsible soil and reduce the
grade of these parcels between six and eight feet. After the
work was completed, William Gordon, an engineer, inspected the
area at the behest of Woodside and pronounced the soil fit to
support a house. In 1995, Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi contracted
with Woodside to purchase a lot and build a home in Panorama
Point. Woodside did not disclose the contents of the Delta or
Woodside's own soil reports to Mr. Yazd or Ms. Yousefi.
%1
Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi moved into their home in
September 1995. By 1996, cracks appeared in the foundation and
the driveway. Doors would not open or close. Evidence of
excessive settling abounded. Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi accepted
Woodside's efforts to repair the damage until April 2002 when a
prospective purchaser of the home discovered that, owing to the
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instability of the soil, major repairs would be required to
shore-up the house and prevent additional damage.
i[8
With this discovery, Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi decided
to seek legal relief. They sued Woodside. They alleged that
Woodside's failure to disclose the presence of the collapsible
soil in the area amounted to a breach of contract and fraudulent
nondisclosure. The district court referred the Yazd-Yousefi
contract claims to arbitration; these claims do not concern us
here. The district court then dismissed the Yazd-Yousefi
fraudulent nondisclosure and concealment claims. The district
court based its ruling on a determination that Woodside had
neither real nor constructive knowledge of the continued presence
of collapsible soil on the buyers' lot.
1(9
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded
the case to the district court. The court of appeals concluded
that the Delta report did contain material information that
Woodside had a duty to disclose to the buyers and, since the
question of whether Woodside actually had knowledge of the report
was in dispute, that summary judgment was improperly granted.
ANALYSIS
flO In order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent
concealment, a plaintiff must prove w (l) that the nondisclosed
information is material, (2) that the nondisclosed information is
known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) that there is a
legal duty to communicate." Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80,
1 9, 31 P.3d 572. These elements are presented in inverse order
of importance. As we will see, this reverse ordering of elements
may have led the court of appeals to apply a flawed analytical
process that nevertheless yielded the correct result: a reversal
of the district court.
I.

WOODSIDE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MR. YAZD AND MS. YOUSEFI CREATED
A LEGAL DUTY

^11 We have stated that u[i]t is axiomatic that one may not
be liable to another in tort absent a duty." Loveland v. Orem
City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1987). Any analysis of a
tort claim, then, begins with an inquiry into the existence and
scope of the duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant.
fl2 The court of appeals, however, began its analysis by
examining the materiality of the Delta report following the
sequence of elements set out in Mitchell. The court of appeals
then wasted little time reaching the conclusion that M[t]here is
little question that the information contained in the Delta
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report would have been material to the Buyers in this case."
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2005 UT App 82, 1 9, 109 P.3d 393.
i|l3 With its finding of materiality in hand, the court of
appeals moved on to the matter of duty. The court appeared to
link the materiality of the Delta report to the existence of
Woodside's duty when it stated, u We can say, however, that if
Woodside possessed the Delta report, or had knowledge of its
content, prior to the sale with the Buyers, it had a duty to
disclose the information to the Buyers." Id. 1 10. It is
important that the court of appeals' opinion not be read to
suggest that the materiality of the Delta report created
Woodside's duty to disclose the contents of the report to
Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi. Indeed, materiality becomes an issue
only after a legal duty has been established.
fl4 The determination of whether a legal duty exists falls
to the court. It is a purely legal question, and since in the
absence of a duty a plaintiff will not be entitled to a remedy,
it is the first question to be answered. See Loveland, 746 P.2d
at 766.
1l5 From where does a duty arise? To properly answer the
duty question, a court must understand that the structure and
dynamics of the relationship between the parties gives rise to
the duty. "The question of whether a duty exists is a question
of law. As always, resolution of this issue begins with an
examination of the legal relationships between the parties,
followed by an analysis of the duties created by these
relationships." Id.
i|l6 A relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely
to be accompanied by a duty than one, for example, in which
parties are in privity of contract. Age, knowledge, influence,
bargaining power, sophistication, and cognitive ability are but
the more prominent among a multitude of life circumstances that a
court may consider in analyzing whether a legal duty is owed by
one party to another. Where a disparity in one or more of these
circumstances distorts the balance between the parties in a
relationship to the degree that one party is exposed to
unreasonable risk, the law may intervene by creating a duty on
the advantaged party to conduct itself in a manner that does not
reward exploitation of its advantage.
Hl7 Legal duty, then, is the product of policy judgments
applied to relationships. DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d
1000, 1003-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Duty is not sacrosanct in
itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
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particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted)). A person who possesses
important, even vital, information of interest to another has no
legal duty to communicate the information where no relationship
between the parties exists.
fl8 An example which illustrates this point is the "special
relationship" doctrine in tort law. A person has no legal duty
to protect another person from the conduct of a stranger unless
the person upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed has a
"special relationship" with either the stranger or the potential
victim. Rather, "[t]he duty to control another person may arise
where a special relationship exists." Wilson v. Valley Mental
Health, 969 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 1998); see also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 315 (1977) (stating that a duty is premised
on a special relationship); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231, 236 (Utah 1993) (adopting Restatement position). Here, it
is Woodside's status as builder-contractor that gives rise to its
legal duty to the home buyers. The communication of material
information to Mr. Yazd and Ms. Yousefi is one of the obligations
that flow from Woodside's assumption of its legal duty.
Ul9 There are occasionally instances in which a court is
called upon to make policy choices based on assessments of
social, economic, and technological conditions. To cite but one
example, the maturation of the industrial revolution and, in
particular, the ever lengthening chain of participants in the
manufacture of goods cut deeply into the doctrines of caveat
emptor and privity of contract that had served well an agrarian
and economically insular nation prior to the last century. This
changed in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., where Justice Cardozo
held that manufacturers must exercise reasonable care to protect
consumers and others who, despite a lack of privity or direct
contractual contact with the manufacturer, may come into contact
with their products. 217 N.Y. 382, 390 (1916).
1(2 0 Typically, courts cede authority over matters of policy
to the political branches of government. When policy
considerations bear on a subject lodged firmly within the court's
sphere, like the common law, it is entirely appropriate for the
court to make the policy judgments necessary to get the law
right.
f21 We have never explicitly recognized that a duty is owed
to buyers of homes by builder-contractors. Insofar as we have
signaled a willingness to impose this duty, it has been by
indirection and expressed in dictum. In Smith v. Frandsen. 2004
UT 55, H 9, 94 P.3d 919, we turned away an attempt by the Smiths,
owners of a home that had been constructed on unsuitable soil, to
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impose a duty on the developer of the subdivision where the home
was located. Our reasons for doing so had as much to do with the
conclusions that we reached about the scope of knowledge acquired
and the responsibility assumed by the Smiths' contractor-builder
as with the issue of whether the developer knew of the poor soil
conditions and whether that knowledge was material.
1(22 Our focus in Smith was not on whether the relationship
between the Smiths and their builder-contractor imposed a legal
duty to disclose information about soil conditions. After all,
the builder-contractor was not a party to the lawsuit. The
inquiry into the builder-contractor's role was, instead, directed
at whether parity existed between what the builder-contractor
knew about the condition of the soil that lay beneath the Smiths'
house and the developer's knowledge of the same soil instability.
This was relevant to our analysis of the developer's duty because
we had formerly indicated that a remote purchaser who had no
privity of contract with a developer might nevertheless recover
for breach of the developer's duty to disclose unsuitable soil
conditions to a previous unsophisticated purchaser who had no
knowledge of the adverse conditions. Id. % 25.
U23 Smith required us to define limits on the right to
recover from remote parties. One limiting principle that we
recognized and applied in Smith was that a duty to disclose
material information is extinguished once the information is
communicated or otherwise acquired by the party to whom the duty
was owed. Id. ^| 17.
if24 Modern home construction requires a high degree of
knowledge and expertise, including knowledge of soil conditions.
We have found that the disparity in skill and knowledge between
home buyers and builder-contractors leads buyers to rely on the
builder-contractor's expertise. Based on these observations, we
chose to adopt in Loveland, 74 6 P.2d 763, a statement of duty
borrowed from Wyoming of "'reasonable care to insure that the
subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of
ordinary, average dwelling house and he must disclose to his
purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to
know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential
building.'" Id. at 769 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anderson v.
Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo. 1984)).
f25 The imposition of this duty had the effect in Smith of
imputing to the builder-contractor the knowledge of deficient
soil conditions that the Smiths accused the developer of failing
to disclose to them. The imputation of this knowledge, however,
cut off any duty the developer may otherwise have owed to future
owners of the property, including the Smiths.
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%26 Although we did not recognize the duty of the buildercontractor in the context of a direct action for recovery brought
by a home buyer in Smith, we today extend its application to that
setting. To do otherwise would fatally undermine the legitimacy
of our reasoning in Smith.
II.

THE MATERIALITY OF THE DELTA REPORT IS IN DISPUTE AND
PROPERLY LEFT TO THE FINDER OF FACT TO DETERMINE

%21 The court of appeals held the Delta report to be
material as a matter of law. Woodside takes issue with this
determination for three reasons: the Delta report did not
concern the Yazd-Yousefi lot, the court of appeals misread the
Delta report in ways that led it to believe it was relevant to
the Yazd-Yousefi lot when it was not, and Woodside's soil study
on the Panorama Point property including the Yazd-Yousefi lot
superseded any materiality to which the Delta report might make
claim.
1f28 We do not believe that the Delta report has earned the
designation of "material" as a matter of law and therefore
reverse the court of appeals on this point. Neither do we accept
Woodside's invitation to stamp the Delta report "immaterial" as a
matter of law. Rather, we find that the question of the report's
materiality is best suited for the finder of fact to answer.
1(29 Woodside's contention that the Delta report cannot be
material because it describes soil conditions on land other than
the Yazd-Yousefi lot has little to recommend it. Property
boundaries are seldom drawn with soil composition in mind, and
information about the suitability of soil for supporting a
dwelling would more likely than not be relevant to predicting the
soil conditions on similar adjacent land. We decline to
categorically deem immaterial all information concerning property
not owned by the party affected by unsuitable soil conditions.
For the purpose of determining materiality in this case, property
boundaries are legally insignificant.
i[3 0 Whatever errors in interpreting the Delta report may
have predisposed the court of appeals to conclude that the report
was material as a matter of law were not so significant as to
persuade us to summarily rule the report immaterial. The Delta
report disclosed soil instability of a magnitude that caused the
Church to scuttle its building plans for the site. There were no
obvious physical or topographical features that would distinguish
the Church parcel from the other portions of Panorama Point. In
our view, these considerations are sufficient to place the
question of the Delta report's materiality in dispute.
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U31 Finally, we reject Woodside's assertion that by
commissioning its own soil study on property that included the
Yazd-Yousefi lot, it rendered immaterial all other information
bearing on the soil conditions at Panorama Point. Woodside
insists that it had no knowledge of the Delta report. Based on
this assertion, its soil study was necessarily prepared without
the benefit of information contained in the Delta report
concerning conditions on the adjacent parcel. At this stage of
the litigation, we do not know whether knowledge of soil
conditions on the Church parcel would have affected the Woodside
soil report. Certainly, it is possible that it could. If the
finder of fact were to determine that Woodside knew of the Delta
report but failed to inform its soils expert of its existence and
contents, the weight of the Woodside soil report could be
substantially diminished.
III.

WE REFINE THE DEFINITION OF ''MATERIALITY" IN THE CONTEXT OF
MATTERS THAT MUST BE COMMUNICATED BY A BUILDER-CONTRACTOR

1(32 In holding that the Delta report was material as a
matter of law, the court of appeals relied on a definition of
materiality as "'something which a buyer or seller of ordinary
intelligence and prudence would think to be of some importance in
determining whether to buy or sell.'" Yazd v. Woodside Homes
Corp., 2005 UT App 82, K 9, 109 P.3d 393 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, % 29, 48 P.3d 235).
In particular, the court of appeals focused on the word "some" in
the definition. We confess that "some" as us€>d in our
description of materiality is ambiguous. When used in a context
in which additional precision concerning quantity or quality is
sought, the word "some" is inherently ambiguous. "Some" is a
word that refers to an unspecified quantity or quality. It is a
word that diminishes precision, not adds to it. When the young
man proclaims to his mother-in-law, "That was some dinner," we
are left with considerable uncertainty about the mother-in-law's
talents as a chef. We believe that when the court of appeals
stated that "we cannot say as a matter of law that the
information would not have been of some interest to the Buyers,"
id., it treated "some" in a way that would permit matters of
lesser importance to qualify as material. This interpretation is
not what we intended.
f33 We take this opportunity to clarify the definition of
materiality as the term is used as an element of fraudulent
concealment and fraudulent nondisclosure. We believe that
requisite clarity can be achieved by deleting the word "some"
from the definition we adopted in Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, H 29.
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%3A To be material, the information must be "important."
Importance, in turn, can be gauged by the degree to which the
information could be expected to influence the judgment of a
person buying property or assenting to a particular purchase
price. In this case, we conclude that a finder of fact could
reasonably find that the contents of the Delta report meet this
definition of materiality. Therefore, we decline to pass on the
status of the Delta report as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
f35 The three elements of fraudulent concealment are best
described in this order:
(1) there is a legal duty to
communicate information, (2) the nondisclosed information is
known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) the nondisclosed
information is material. In this case, these elements are yet to
be adjudicated and remain to be proved. The most important
element is the existence of a duty, which arises from the
relationship between the parties. We hold that a developerbuilder may owe his buyer a duty to disclose information known to
him concerning real property, including property other than that
conveyed to the buyer, when that information is material to the
condition of the property purchased by the buyer. Both knowledge
of the Delta report and its importance to the buyers remain
contested factual issues that bear on the existence of a duty.
Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' reversal of summary
j udgment.
f36 Finally, we reverse the court of appeals' holding that
the Delta report was material as a matter of law. We leave the
trier of fact to determine whether the Delta report was known to
Woodside and whether its content was sufficiently important such
that its disclosure would have influenced the decisions made by
the buyers with respect to this property.

13 7 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Judge Christiansen concur in Justice
Nehring's opinion.
1(38 Having disqualified herself, Justice Parrish does not
participate herein; District Judge Terry L. Christiansen sat.
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